

~~PLEASE CLEAR WITH OFFICE OF  
ORIGIN BEFORE INITIATING AC-  
TION BASED ON THIS MEMORANDUM~~

SECRET CONTROL

1P1

DB # 1225

STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT, WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, D.C.

*Sergeant*

30 September 1946

COUNTRY: Japan, Northern Europe.  
SUBJECT: Japanese Wartime Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe,  
DATE OF INFORMATION: 1940-1945, with earlier background  
EVALUATION: B-2, except as otherwise noted.  
REFERENCES:  
(a) OMODERA, Major General Makoto -- Biographical Sketch  
of: SSU, 25 September 1946, DB #1226.  
(b) OTOUCHI, Major General Hirose, and HIROSE, Colonel  
Eiichi -- Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 25 September  
1946, DB #1229.  
(c) INOUE, Yoichi; ITO, Colonel Kiyokazu; KIGOSHI, Major  
Yasukazu; SATO, Kichinosuke; and SATO, Major Tatsuya --  
Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 27 Sept. 1946, DB #1246.  
(d) Others, as indicated.

The following survey is based on information obtained from  
interrogation of subjects of References (a), (b) and (c) at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, by  
a representative of SSU. OMODERA was under interrogation from 6 May to 20 July  
1946, the others from 3 June to 20 July.

Table of Contents

- I. Introduction.
- II. Development and Objectives of the Offices of  
Military Attaché at Stockholm and Helsinki.
- III. Intelligence Aids and Methods.
  1. Finances
  2. Communications
  3. Methods Used in the Gathering of Intelli-  
gence and the Maintenance of Security.
- IV. Contacts and Sources
  1. Polish
  2. Finnish and Baltic
  3. German
  4. Hungarian
  5. Swedish
  6. Relations with Other Japanese Missions in  
Europe
- V. Summary of Intelligence Obtained

I. INTRODUCTION

Statements made under interrogation by subjects of References (a), (b) and  
(c) -- particularly OMODERA, Japanese Military Attaché at Stockholm from 1941 to 1945,  
and OTOUCHI, who held the same post at Helsinki from 1940 to 1944 -- have revealed the

DB #1225

- 1 -

SECRET CONTROL

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2003

SECRET CONTROL

following important and hitherto little known facts about Japanese intelligence activities in Europe before and during World War II.

First, the Japanese Army General Staff has for many years collaborated closely with the General Staffs of the Polish, Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian Armies in subversive and intelligence activities against Russia. After the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the western Allies were also included as one of their targets. This collaboration included the exchange by official agreement of General Staff officers for training and instruction, the exchange of crypto-analytic and other intelligence material, joint financing and planning of subversive operations in peace as well as in war, and joint training and direction of espionage and sabotage agents.

Second, in Europe the Japanese Military Attachés functioned as leading figures in all such activities. Both in peace and in war they were responsible not only for normal diplomatic duties and the generally recognized intelligence work of military representatives in foreign countries, but also for every kind of subversive activity including direct contact with espionage and sabotage agents, maintenance of clandestine W/T communications, radio interception and illegal commercial operation. In Sweden, Finland, Poland and the Baltic states, they were the only Japanese to do this work, and there is little if any evidence to show that the Navy or the Foreign Office played more than a secondary role insofar as intelligence was concerned.

Third, ONODERA and ONUCHI themselves had been trained for years as specialists in Russian intelligence. When the former was first sent to Sweden it was in that capacity only. However, as the war developed his office gradually became the most important Japanese espionage post in Europe with directives covering all fronts and with close to 2,000,000 Yen held at his disposal for intelligence operations. His organization, through which he obtained outstandingly successful results, was based on the collaboration already mentioned. RYBIKOWSKI, former head of the German Section in Department II of the Polish General Staff, worked in his office for almost three and a half years. MAASING, former chief of Department II of the Estonian General Staff and officially a refugee in Stockholm, was his chief agent throughout the war. When the Finnish crypto-analytic section under HALLAMAA fled to Sweden they relied on ONODERA for funds and placed the results of their work at his disposal. In addition to these he also had a source within the Swedish General Staff in the person of Major PETERSEN and he made extensive exchanges of intelligence material with Karl Heinz KRAMER, who is generally acknowledged to have been one of the Abwehr's most successful operators.

SECRET CONTROL

III. DEVELOPMENT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF MILITARY ATTACHE AT STOCKHOLM AND HELSINKI

A. STOCKHOLM

1. Appointment and Authority

ONODERA was appointed to the post of Military Attaché at Stockholm in November 1940 and assumed it officially on 5 February 1941, succeeding Colonel NISHIMURA Toshio, an expert on Russia and Finland. He was told that the Russian and German Sections in Department II of the Imperial General Staff wanted him stationed in Europe as one of their foremost Russian specialists. His job was to be an observer and to study the war from what was considered a second line position, in contrast with the first line of quasi-operational posts in the belligerent countries. Such an assignment seemed the more fitting in that the study of strategy was another of his specialties. ONODERA stresses that his office in Stockholm was never planned as an active intelligence center and became so only as a result of the progress of the war. He was always handicapped by the fact that he had left Japan entirely unprepared for such a development and therefore never obtained the staff or equipment appropriate to an operational intelligence post.

Though accredited only to the Swedish Government, he was considered responsible also for Norway and Denmark. He frequently went to Norway, where he had good connections in German military circles. Denmark was kept closed by the Germans because of unsettled conditions, and he succeeded in going there only on his way to Berlin and for one meeting with the representatives of Ast Oslo.

ONODERA was not connected administratively with any other military mission in Europe. He claims to have been completely independent even with the Japanese Legation at Stockholm, and cites as evidence the facts that his funds were separate (he had no contact with MAKIMURA, the Legation paymaster) and that he had a personal code for direct communication with Tokyo.

2. Directives

The directives which ONODERA received from Tokyo changed, as did the nature of his work, with the progress of the war. In general they were of two types, basic and special. He never felt bound by them and frequently acted on personal initiative when he thought he could best serve his country's interests in that way.

a. Basic Directives

- i. General intelligence on Russia-military, technical, political and economic. This was proper to the Stockholm post and fitted in with his own previous training.
- ii. General intelligence on Germany. This was also a regular target for the Stockholm post. It was altered somewhat as Japan and Germany became more closely allied, but continued nevertheless throughout the war.
- iii. General intelligence on Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and, after August 1944, Finland and the Baltic countries.
- iv. Study of the general strategic development of the war.
- v. Study of new tactical methods developed by both sides. Japanese military publications on this subject, some of which had been prepared by ONODERA himself, were considered to be out-dated.
- vi. General intelligence on the western Allies (after 8 December 1941).

SECRET CONTROL

b. Special Directives

- i. February 1941. To collect all material on German preparations for the invasion of Britain, with particular emphasis on the operational date. ONODERA says that Tokyo evidently wished to coordinate plans in the Pacific with German action in Europe.

He reported on the basis of information obtained from German and Estonian sources that not Britain but Russia was about to be invaded. Tokyo GHQ had been receiving contrary reports from OSHIMA in Berlin and at first refused to believe ONODERA. When his wife arrived in May 1941, she warned him that Headquarters' officials were very displeased with him and that he could expect to be recalled.

- ii. September 1944. To make arrangements to take over the espionage organizations of the Axis powers. (For an account of ONODERA's attempts to do this see "Japanese Wartime Collaboration with the German Intelligence Service" -- SSU, 4 October 1946, DB #1239.)
- iii. May 1945. To collect all information on the redeployment of the Allied forces in the European theater to the Far East.
- iv. February 1944. To purchase ball bearings in Sweden, regardless of the laws forbidding their exportation. This was an especially urgent directive. ONODERA made three unsuccessful attempts to carry it out. The first was through the Bulgarian Minister NICOLAEFF and the Commercial Attaché SERAFINOV, who had agreed to make the purchases for him and arrange for the shipment to Germany where the ball bearings were to be forwarded to Japan by submarine or blockade runner. However, Bulgaria surrendered before it was possible to carry this out.

The second attempt was through VOROZKORNDY and others of the Hungarian Legation. This also failed because Hungary was invaded.

The third was through a Swedish contact, ERIC ERICSSON, who claimed to have made the necessary arrangements with FINKE, the representative of the S.D. in Sweden. At one time they planned to send the ball bearings by air over the northern route, but this scheme also fell through. ERICSSON received about 7000 kroner for preliminary expenses. ONODERA had been authorized to spend the total of the War Ministry funds in his possession for this purpose.

3. Development of Intelligence Activities in Stockholm

Before the outbreak of the Russo-German war the Japanese mission in Stockholm was regarded as relatively unimportant in the over-all organization for Europe. Even after June 1941 it continued to be neglected by Japanese military circles, who were under strong German influence. At the beginning of 1942 it began to be interesting as an observer's post and it was somewhat strengthened by the arrival from Berlin and Paris of newspaper men who began to report on the western Allies to their news services. A representative each of Mitsui and Mitsubishi was added to the Military Attaché's office at that time - another Mitsui man a few months later - and in the middle of 1942 a Naval Attaché's office was created.

At the end of the same year, the staff of the Legation being nearly doubled with the arrival of a new minister (OKAMOTO), a stronger impulse was given to intelligence work. Late in 1943 some members of the diplomatic mission to Rome came to Stockholm. By mid-1944 the effective distribution of Japanese diplomatic staffs in

continental Europe had changed considerably: the Berlin mission had begun to feel that its days were numbered, the French mission was completely dissolved, and the Japanese diplomatic situation in Spain and Portugal had become most uncertain. As a result, Stockholm became a vital point for Japanese intelligence and people were transferred there from each of the places mentioned. At this time there was again a noted increase in press work. Finally in 1945 a group of twenty naval officers headed by Admiral ABE arrived from Denmark. (They were interned by the Swedes, however, and were never able to do any intelligence work.)

Notwithstanding these developments, ONODERA emphasizes that throughout the war, to the best of his knowledge, his own office was the only Japanese organization in Sweden which was engaged in secret intelligence operations.

#### 4. Office and Personnel

The Military Attaché's office was situated at Linnegatan 28. ONODERA and his family lived in the same apartment building. Other members of the office had their own houses or flats in Stockholm and its suburbs. During the summer months of June, July and August a house was rented near Stockholm at Djursholm, Stockholm Weg 15. Its owners were Miss ~~WERNER-SCHMITT~~, sister of the chief of the Swedish General Staff Intelligence Department, and Mrs. BERGENDAHL, a relative of Minister of Foreign Affairs. All the office force were frequently invited to this summer place and it was occasionally used for business purposes.

When ONODERA arrived in 1941 his only helper was YOGOI, a refugee business man. Mrs. ONODERA was obliged to assist with office work until April 1942, when HOMIA and INOUYE (of Mitsui and Mitsubishi respectively), were assigned to the office. Neither of these men was trained for intelligence work. In October of the same year they were joined by SATO Kichinosuke (Mitsui), who came from Berlin not because of his qualifications but to recover from a serious case of ulcers.

It was not until early in 1944 when Major SATO Tatsuya came from the disbanded Italian mission that an officer was assigned to ONODERA as Assistant Military Attaché. SATO was an aircraft engineer with little experience or interest in intelligence work. In December 1944 Colonel ITO and Major KIGOSHI were transferred to Stockholm. Again neither was connected with the General Staff or had had any training in intelligence.

The Stockholm office was never provided with the proper stenographic help for work on Japanese reports. ONODERA made repeated requests for a Japanese female secretary to be sent from Tokyo, but the outbreak of the Russo-German war made this impossible. As a result all secretarial work had to be done by his assistants.

For a list of personnel of the Office of the Military Attaché at Stockholm, with brief description of each, see APPENDIX A. (The staff of the rest of the Legation is given in APPENDIX D.)

#### 5. Japanese Newsmen in Stockholm

ONODERA states emphatically that no Japanese journalist was ever employed in his office and that he never used one for intelligence work. (He explains a prevalent impression to the contrary by the fact that the newsmen, many of whom had friends among his assistants, were always using his office as their meeting place and that at least once a week Mrs. ONODERA gave Japanese dinner parties to which they were all invited.) He has never heard of any official arrangement, secret or otherwise, by which Japanese military missions were connected with newsmen for intelligence. The majority of the journalists, he says, were sent to Stockholm after December 1941 to observe developments in the United States and Great Britain and report on them to the head office of their agencies in Tokyo. They tried to keep in contact with foreign journalists and they made it their business to obtain all foreign newspapers and publications which came to Sweden, including those which reached the country illegally in spite of British and American censorship laws. There was much traffic in these and high prices were paid for them. According to ONODERA, the chief source from which they came was the crews of planes arriving from England.

SECRET CONTROL

The Japanese journalists communicated directly with their Tokyo agencies through Swedish commercial telegraph companies. They were able to do so at a reasonable rate because there existed mutual exchange contracts between Swedish and Japanese news services. In the case of Domei, OHODERA made an agreement whereby he could use these facilities and thus avoid delay in reporting non-confidential information.

Until the end of 1942 the Counsellor of the Japanese Legation (KODA Jotaro) was officially in charge of the journalists. When the new minister (OKAMOTO) arrived he took them over himself. In the winter of 1944 press conferences were instituted at the Legation. They were attended by the Minister, the Counsellor and the service attachés or their representatives. The purpose of the meetings was to review the progress of the war and to obtain from the journalists any information of value. They were a failure because none of the journalists ever contributed anything.

OHODERA says that he made several unsuccessful efforts to use the journalists. He offered to allow them to send confidential news to Tokyo by using his secret code, but they never availed themselves of it. In 1944 when he was looking for new sources on the western Allies, he carefully considered each one of them as a potential intermediary with foreign journalists for intelligence purposes. He decided not to use any of them, however, because without exception they lacked the personal initiative and discretion essential to such work. If, for example, they heard that one of the Legation officials had an interesting connection, they almost always broke in to obtain a story. On one occasion Major SATO had a promising contact with RIEDEL, the German Assistant Air Attaché, which was spoiled by KOGO, who was after something sensational. Again, Counsellor KODA had an opportunity to obtain interesting material from the renegade Soviet diplomat DMITRIEVSKY but lost it because of the interference of KOGO and URESHIMO.

Not until 1945 did OHODERA meet a journalist who suited his purposes. For an account of this man and his relationship with OHODERA, see SSU memorandum "OKAMOTO Momotaro," 7 October 1946, DB #1247.

Brief notes on the Japanese news services and their representatives in Stockholm will be found in APPENDIX C.

B. HELSINKI

1. Appointment and Authority

The post which Maj. Gen. (then Colonel) Hirose ONUUCHI took over on his arrival in Helsinki on 29 September 1940 had formerly come under the authority of the Stockholm Legation and had usually been occupied by an Assistant Military Attaché. It was changed into a full time position when the outbreak of war against Poland and the occupation of the Baltic States by the USSR left Finland as the only border state of the Soviet Union in northern Europe.

ONOUCHI's predecessor, Col. NISHIMURA, continued to serve as Military Attaché at Stockholm until relieved by OHODERA in February 1941.

2. Directives

ONOUCHI says that he received no special directives from Tokyo Headquarters because he had only one code, the additive of which was considered weak. Orders were therefore sent more frequently to offices like those in Berlin, Rome and Stockholm, which had numerous codes and were felt to be more secure. His general directives were as follows:

1. General intelligence on the USSR. This was his chief objective. Priority was to be given to order of battle, tactics, forest and street fighting, the use of tanks and new weapons.

SECRET CONTROL

- ii. General intelligence covering Finland. Military developments, war potential, political conditions.
- iii. General intelligence covering Germany. This was to be concentrated on German military activity in Finland and the Baltic area, with priorities similar to those listed under "i".
- iv. Anglo-American order of battle. (Directives concerned with the western Allies were received after December 1941.)
- v. Anglo-American shipping.
- vi. Collaboration on crypto-analysis with the Finnish General Staff. This was a highly secret order received from the Central Special Intelligence Bureau of the Imperial General Staff, and coincided with the arrival of Lt. Col. HIROSE Eiichi. The Minister himself was not advised of the nature of HIROSE's mission, and all subsequent details were handled only by HIROSE. (See below, III 2. - Communications)

3. Office and Personnel

In 1940 the Military Attaché's office and residence were both located at Parkgarten. Later, in 1943, an office was established at 28 Karewan in a house rented from Col. SOMERTO. In 1944 the residence at Parkgarten was bombed and ONUCHI moved to Grankura, where the bulk of the office work (including receipt of messages) was carried on, although a small office continued to be maintained in Helsinki.

Despite the importance and quantity of the intelligence available at Helsinki, ONUCHI's staff was extremely small. Only one officer was assigned to him permanently as an assistant. He occasionally received visits from student officers, but they were on special missions and could not be considered as members of his staff. His civilian assistants were also inadequate in number.

For a list of personnel of the Office of the Military Attaché at Helsinki, see APPENDIX B.

SECRET CONTROL

III. INTELLIGENCE AIDS AND METHODS

1. Finances

(For supplementary detail see SSU memorandum "Wartime Finances of the Japanese Military Attachés at Stockholm and Helsinki," 4 October 1946, DB #1232.)

A. STOCKHOLM

The funds assigned to the Military Attaché's Office came directly from Tokyo and were entirely independent of the Legation. ONODERA dealt with the diplomatic finance officers only after the Japanese surrender, when he was instructed to hand over the balance of his resources to them. His budget was divided into three categories: office administration, intelligence, and the purchase of war materials. The administrative and intelligence funds came from the General Staff; the purchasing account was supplied by the War Ministry and maintained in ONODERA's name by representatives of the Berlin offices of OKURA, MITSUI, MITSUBISHI and SHOWA TSUSHO. These companies were commissioned by the Japanese Government to buy war materials (ball bearings, piano wire, etc.) in Sweden, but they could not obtain foreign currency in sufficient quantities from the Reichsbank, which released it only to certain high-ranking diplomats. A portion of this account was assigned to Air Force purchases and was administered by Major SATO.

Until August 1941 payments were made in dollars by the Yokohama Specie Bank in Tokyo through New York to the Military Attaché's account in the Enskilda Banken in Stockholm. The dollars were then changed into kroner by ONODERA. From August 1941 to the end of 1942 all funds were transferred by way of the Y.S.B. Berlin branch. Thereafter, until the end of the war, money from the General Staff came directly from the Y.S.B. in Tokyo to the Skandinaviska Banken in Stockholm and that from the War Ministry directly to the Enskilda Banken. The accounts in both banks were in ONODERA's name.

ONODERA gives the following account of total yearly expenditures from General Staff funds (evaluate B-3):

	<u>Administration</u>	<u>Intelligence</u>
1941	Kr. 120,000	Kr. 30,000
1942	Kr. 120,000	Kr. 40,000
1943	Kr. 120,000	Kr. 40,000
1944	Kr. 120,000	Kr. 360,000
1945 (till Nov.)	Kr. 75,000	Kr. 40,000

The largest item of administrative expense was telegrams, with supplies next and general administration (including certain payroll disbursements) last. (In 1942-1944 their annual average was Kr. 75,000, Kr. 25,000 and Kr. 20,000 respectively.) The intelligence fund was used to make direct payment to secret sources, for the transmission of money to agents abroad, for presents to officials and other contacts and for entertainment; small sums also went to INOUE for the payment of publications obtained from clandestine sources.

During the early years of the war ONODERA himself was paymaster; after December 1944 the job was turned over to KIGOSHI. Among the civilians HOTTA, SATO and INOUE continued to receive their salaries from Mitsubishi and Mitsui, as did the press representatives from their respective newspapers or services. All civilians received additional compensation from ONODERA for overtime. SAZAKI, a clerk originally assigned to Stockholm, continued on the payroll even though he moved first to Helsinki and later to HIGUCHI's office in Berlin. ONODERA put about 10,000 Kroner of the administrative fund at ONOUCHI's disposal each month for the purchase of daily necessities not available in Helsinki. He also received sums for similar purchases from his colleagues throughout the belligerent and occupied countries.

SECRET CONTROL

B. HELSINKI

All funds sent by the Japanese General Staff to the Office of the Military Attaché in Finland were transferred through the Yokohama Specie Bank's Berlin branch. As the war progressed and the disappearance of foreign trade made the acquisition of foreign currencies increasingly difficult, the Y.S.B. found it almost impossible to carry out the necessary conversion into Finnish or Swedish currency. Resulting delays in the arrival of funds frequently made it hard for ONOUCHI to cover his office expenses, particularly payments for communication services. In 1944 an agreement was finally reached for the transfers to be effected through a bank in Switzerland (name not remembered).

There were two office budgets, one for administration and the other for intelligence. The latter served a function similar to that of ONODERA in being expended for information obtained from secret sources, gifts, entertainment, the salary of one Finnish private secretary, etc. ONOUCHI says that his average yearly expenditures for such items outside of exceptional cases was 380,000 Finnish Marks or 58,000 Yen. The administrative budget averaged 1,476,000 Marks or 147,600 Yen annually: 24,000 Yen for office expenses, 3600 for salaries and 120,000 for communications. HIROSE, who took over the functions of paymaster in 1944, gives the same figures for the administrative account but estimates intelligence expenses at 20,000 Yen yearly. In making these he paid money to ONOUCHI on demand in exchange for a receipt, without always knowing to whom payment was made. (Evaluation of figures in above paragraph, B-3.)

2. Communications

(For supplementary detail see SSU memorandum "Wartime Communication Facilities of the Japanese Military Attachés at Stockholm and Helsinki," 4 October 1946, DB #1234.)

A. STOCKHOLM

In reporting to Tokyo Headquarters and in communicating with the other Japanese missions in Europe, ONODERA used ordinary mail, diplomatic couriers, radio and secret W/T.

Before the outbreak of the Russo-German war on 22 June 1941, liaison with Tokyo was made by official Japanese couriers about once a month; they travelled by train, air or both. Thereafter and until August 1945 there was no regular courier service to and from Japan, and the few documents which were sent back and forth were carried either by diplomatic parties who had received visas to cross Russia or by blockade runners and U-boats.

Courier service within Europe was carried out by officers from the staffs of the various Japanese diplomatic missions. ONODERA says that the Stockholm office sent couriers only to Helsinki and Berlin. It was rarely necessary for him to dispatch any of his personnel because everyone in the belligerent or occupied countries wanted to make trips to Stockholm to buy food and other articles which were rationed or unobtainable elsewhere. When he did send a pouch by someone in his own office it was carried by an officer accompanied by one of the civilians. ONODERA frequently took the pouch to Berlin himself.

He says that the only Japanese military radio station which existed in Europe during the war was at Budapest, and that hardly ever functioned. All his radio reports were sent to Tokyo through Swedish commercial cables. Before June 1941 current material was sent to the office of the Military Attaché in Moscow and forwarded through a Russian company because of a Russo-Japanese radio contract allowing relatively cheap rates. Later it was forwarded through Berlin, where a similar arrangement existed with the Germans. Urgent dispatches were sent directly from Stockholm. Press material also went directly because of a mutual exchange agreement between the Swedish and Japanese news services.

SECRET CONTROL

ONODERA claims to have no knowledge of the existence of W/T sets in the offices of any of his colleagues in the other neutral countries of Europe. He himself had not been equipped with any by Tokyo; he admits having come into possession of two which, however, he says he never used. He declares that his connection with clandestine W/T work was largely indirect, through the Finnish I.S., the Pole RIBI! JWSKI or the Estonian MAASING.

B. HELSINKI

Until June 1941 a regular courier came to Helsinki each month from Tokyo via Moscow. After the outbreak of the war between Russia and Germany this service was broken off and couriers were used only for trips to Stockholm and Berlin. Since there were no professional diplomatic couriers available, the trips were made by office personnel; URA was the one most frequently sent. Messages were occasionally dispatched, as by the Stockholm office, via blockade runner or submarine, but never those which contained documents of any value.

After June 1941 telegrams were the only way of transmitting reports to Tokyo. They were of two kinds, urgent and routine. Urgent messages were sent directly from the Helsinki General Post Office, which used its own discretion in routing via Berlin or Sweden, depending on atmospheric conditions. This was the more direct method but it was very expensive, one word costing 50 Finnish Marks (5 Yen).

Routine messages were dispatched through the Helsinki Post Office to the Military Attaché in Berlin. At the beginning of the text the destination of each message was indicated: "G" stood for the Berlin Military Attaché, "A" for Tokyo only and "GA" for both Tokyo and Berlin. (These indicators were changed from time to time.) This method was cheaper because of the wireless telegraph rate agreements with Germany, but it had the disadvantage of taking a long time.

Both radio and telephone were used to communicate with other Japanese missions in Europe.

3. Methods Used in the Gathering of Intelligence and the Maintenance of Security

Both ONODERA and ONUCHI laid a substantial part of the foundation of their highly successful intelligence work at Stockholm and Helsinki in their previous assignments to the post of Military Attaché at Riga, Latvia -- ONODERA in 1936-1938 and ONUCHI in 1959-1940. Both were adept at exploiting the contacts made by themselves at that time and by their predecessors earlier. ONUCHI was not explicit in the course of his brief preliminary interrogation on the subject of his techniques as such; the following summary was given by ONODERA.

He used two principal methods of obtaining intelligence. The first and most successful was espionage, his own specialty. The second was newspaper and publication analysis which he left in the hands of his assistants, assigning to each the subjects for which his technical experience best fitted him.

He prefers to work alone. He never confided fully in any of his assistants with regard to intelligence work. When he called on them it was for isolated jobs of a technical nature and he never allowed them to have complete knowledge of his methods. He refers to himself as a dictator and says that he likes to be the only one giving orders and to know that all those who are working with him are completely dependent on him.

a. Positive Intelligence

ONODERA believes in working with organizations rather than with individuals. An individual cannot provide information unless related to some sort of organization,

SECRET CONTROL

and a well-established organization is the only source from which a Military Attaché can hope to get a constant flow of reliable information. He says that as a first step he always established contact with the leading intelligence officers, both native and foreign, in the country to which he was accredited. He then studied and appraised their possibilities and formulated a plan by which he could best obtain what they had to offer.

He believes that the relationship in such a case must be initially based on collaboration and friendship rather than on money. The more gradually the relationship is built up the better. His own best sources during the war were men whom he had known for many years. His second step was, whenever possible, to find a way of ensuring the loyalty of the men he considered valuable by binding them to him through gratitude for services rendered to their families or for protection in difficult times. He stresses that he never ceased to plan for the future in this connection, and cites as an example his attempts to find young Hungarian scientists whose education he could finance, thus placing them under obligation to Japan. (See SSU memorandum "Possible Diversion of Funds of the Japanese Military Attaché at Stockholm to the Training of Hungarian & Finnish Students...." - 30 September 1946, DB #1233.)

He says that he got some of his best results by working with the General Staffs of small countries. They were usually better informed than anyone else with respect to their powerful neighbors; they had many possibilities for obtaining intelligence but did not possess the necessary finances. He found that if he was tactful he could supply them with money and gradually create a situation whereby they were morally obliged to give him information because their debt had become so large.

To illustrate his theory he gives the following examples taken from his experiences during the war. In each case he combined friendship, collaboration or money in varying degrees to suit the situation.

- i. Estonia: He formed friendships working with Estonian General Staff officers while Military Attaché in Riga from 1936 to 1938. At that time he did a great deal to finance their common operations. Later when many of the same officers were in financial difficulties in Germany he supported their families from Stockholm. Consequently he received information from them throughout the war even when they were working for other services. He says that as the German situation became worse, almost all the best Estonians made known their wish to come and work with him in Stockholm.
- ii. Finland: During the first part of the war his collaboration with the Finns was based on friendship and exchange of information. Later after their defeat he made them a considerable payment, not only for what they could offer at the time, but in the hope that it would bind them to him for the future.
- iii. Poland: This very fruitful relationship had been prepared in earlier years by other Japanese officers. ONODERA's own work was entirely dependent on the friendship and protection which he gave to one man, RYBIKOWSKY.
- iv. Germany: Friendship and the necessary collaboration between two allies fighting a war together were the basic elements of his relationship in this case.
- v. Hungary: The limited material obtained from the Hungarians was given in official exchanges with the Military Attaché.
- vi. Sweden: In this case official exchanges were facilitated to some extent by personal friendships.

For further details of ONODERA's relationship with the above services see below, part IV (Contacts and Sources).

SECRET CONTROL

b. Counter-Intelligence and Security

The Japanese mission in Stockholm had no joint security system. The Legation was deplorably lax in this respect and did not institute a night watch until the autumn of 1944. ONODERA solved his own problem separately; he recalls no case of penetration of his office.

It was a general rule among the Japanese never to use a foreign pouch, even that of an ally, for sending classified material. Out of necessity ONODERA once used the Polish pouch in an attempt to send money to the Japanese Military Attaché in Moscow, a venture which failed because the money was intercepted by the British at Gibraltar and returned to Stockholm. He also sent an official letter to the Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin through WAGNER and the Abwehr pouch, but it never reached its destination despite his repeated protests and WAGNER's promises.

His contact with the Finns was the best method for ensuring the protection of his codes. The Japanese crypt-analytical station in Budapest also contributed: HAYASHI, the Military Attaché, once warned the Stockholm Legation that one of its ciphers had been broken by the British. However, subsequent tests initiated by Minister OKAMOTO tended to contradict his statement.

ONODERA's chief source of counter-espionage information was MAASING, to whom he went to check all new sources and agents. MAASING had agents in WAGNER's organization, in the Russian press office and in the British passport control office. Through them it was possible to find out about and forestall any action which was being planned against the Japanese. ONODERA does not know the identity of any of these men. MAASING's contacts in the Swedish police served to warn ONODERA of danger from that quarter. A check on MAASING himself was provided by ONODERA's close personal relationship with many of his former colleagues on the Estonian General Staff.

HIGUCHI, who worked in liaison at Berlin with the German counter-espionage agency, was a former pupil of ONODERA's and kept him informed of German activity and intentions, as did the Manchurian diplomatic representatives in Berlin.

c. Penetration Agents

ONODERA used the Finnish and Baltic organizations for penetration work against his principal target, Russia. This was simply the continuation of work already begun during his stay in Riga. It was not necessary for him to be connected with any of the details. As the war developed and he received directives to initiate intelligence operations against the western Allies, he began extensive preparations for this work. However, he says that he only succeeded in launching one mission - against Britain - and that this one was of dubious reliability.

He claims never to have used consciously any double agents. The closest he came to doing so was in the case of BELLEGARDE, agent of the mission just referred to. ONODERA realized that he must be working for the British but never openly disclosed the suspicion. He says further that he was well aware that many of the Scandinavian and Baltic agents with whom he worked were also employed by the Allies, but in most cases he trusted them and felt that the best way of conserving their loyalty was to make no attempt to turn such activity to his own use. He was, of course, always careful to check them whenever an important matter was under consideration.

d. Deception Material

ONODERA says that it was very difficult for him to use deception material because he never received any information from Tokyo regarding Japanese strategy in the war. He studied the possibilities of using as channels for this purpose the journalists whose agencies had exchange agreements with Swedish papers (for instance, Yomiuri with the Afton-Bladet, Nichi Nichi with the Svenskaderblat, and Domei with T. T.). However, lack of properly coordinated material made this impossible.

SECRET CONTROL

MAASING occasionally passed tendentious information through his agents to the Russian Legation, but ONODERA was not directly connected with this aspect of MAASING's activity.

He was himself the recipient of deception material several times during the war from both the Allies and the Germans. In 1941, the latter, in an attempt to hurry Japan's entry into the war, put on a deliberate campaign to convince Ambassador OSHIMA in Berlin that they were going to invade Great Britain. OSHIMA was taken to visit the invading bases and shown troops in training and large quantities of landing craft. ONODERA, on visiting the headquarters of Commanding General FALKENHORST of the German occupation forces in Norway, was told the same story by a Col. VORONITSKY.

From the British, whose talent he admires in this respect, ONODERA believes that he received the following false information:

- i. Separate peace rumors. These came to him through the most varied sources, including MAASING (who had obtained it from SCHHEEL, an Estonian refugee in Stockholm) and DMITRIEVSKY, the renegade Soviet diplomat.
- ii. False dates for the Normandy landings. These reports were in the form of an attempt to persuade the Japanese and the Germans that the Allies would be afraid to risk the operation. As soon as the large-scale bombing attack began, however, it became evident that they were untrue.
- iii. Russian entry into the war against Japan. This material was more cleverly placed than any other. It came to ONODERA through VAGY of the Hungarian Legation; he had received it from a Hungarian Jewish refugee banker in Stockholm. It was given out just before the 1943 Attaché's meeting in Rome, where it was discussed and reported to Tokyo. ONODERA heard later that it had caused a great deal of trouble in the General Staff.
- iv. The redeployment of the American 8th Bomber Command to the Far East through Russia, and the visit of an American Air Mission to Russian air bases in Eastern Siberia. Both items came through KRAEMER of the Abwehr, but ONODERA believes the original instigator to have been British. These reports also were taken seriously in Japan because they were written in great detail. ONODERA always suspected the air mission report on account of a reference to Suirocwka, near Vladivostok, where he knew there was no airfield.

IV. CONTACTS AND SOURCES

1. Polish

A. BACKGROUND

Collaboration between the Polish and Japanese General Staffs dates back to the Russo-Japanese war and has always been based on a common hatred of Russia. It began in Europe early in the century between General Baron AKASHI, Military Attaché in Stockholm, and General PILSUDSKI. A further tie was provided by officers who had been prisoners of war in Japan and who had been so kindly treated by the Japanese that they formed a club, members of which entertained Japanese officers later coming to Poland as diplomatic representatives. ONODERA says there were many cases in which such Japanese lived at the homes of club members during their stay in Poland. (He adds that it was formerly a Japanese tradition to treat prisoners well and that he was profoundly shocked to hear what had happened during World War II). Active collaboration between the two countries on a military basis began immediately after the last war, when PILSUDSKI was president of Poland. ONODERA does not know the details of what took place at that time. He says that Major General YAMAWAKI Masataka and Lt. General FUJITSUKA are well informed in this regard.

Until 1939 the center of Japanese intelligence activity against Russia was always in the Warsaw Military Attaché's office. An arrangement existed whereby Japanese officers were periodically sent to Poland to study Russian codes with the Polish General Staff crypto-analytical section. ONODERA cites the following Japanese officers who were trained according to this agreement: General HYAKUTAKE Seikichi and General OKUBO Shunjiro in the late 1920's; Col. SAKAI (deceased) and Col. KUDO in the early 1930's; Col. SAKURAI Nobuta and Col. FUKAI Eiichi in 1935-1936.

The Japanese system of press and document analysis practiced so extensively during the war and its successful use for intelligence purposes were also learned from the Poles. Col. KOWALESKI, later Polish Military Attaché in Lisbon, was an authority on this system and had visited Japan for the purpose of teaching it; two or three other Polish officials had similarly instructed members of the Kwantung Army Intelligence Service in Harbin. In exchange for such instruction the Japanese undertook to supply the Poles with Soviet code intercepts and other intelligence material obtained in the Far East.

As a result of this background of cooperation, when Poland was occupied by the Germans and the Russians in 1939, and the Polish General Staff forced to take refuge in London, Col. GANO (head of the Polish T. S.) proposed to Col. UEDA (Japanese Military Attaché in Warsaw) that the Japanese take over the Polish intelligence organizations against Russia and Germany. This offer was officially refused by Tokyo Headquarters because of the alliance with Germany. However, individual Japanese and Polish officers in Europe continued to work together under cover, and Poles who had stayed behind on the continent were given Japanese or Manchurian passports and employed in the Embassies and Consulates.

Wishing to take every advantage of the possibilities of this collaboration, Col. GANO in 1940 arranged with Col. UEDA to send a Polish intelligence mission to the Far East for work on intelligence against the USSR, in Japan or at Kwantung Army Headquarters. When most members of this mission returned to Europe in 1942 with the Polish Military Attaché to Tokyo, Col. REWETOW, two (one a lieutenant named SKORA) sought and obtained permission to remain in the Far East and continue their work against Russia in secret, still in collaboration with the Japanese. The request was forwarded to Polish Headquarters in London through ONODERA's office. Within a short time General SIKORSKI, despite the fact that a state of war existed between Poland and Japan, answered that permission was given in accordance with the long tradition of collaboration between the two countries. Lieutenant SKORA, who ONODERA thinks is connected with crypto-analysis, was last heard of in Manchuria.

SECRET CONTROL

B. ONODERA

ONODERA's own successful and extensive collaboration with the Poles was centered around the ex-Polish General Staff intelligence officer RYBIKOWSKI, who worked with him in his office for three and a half years. When ONODERA arrived in Stockholm, he found collaboration between the Japanese and the Poles already established and functioning. In 1940 Col. NISHIMURA, ONODERA's predecessor, had agreed with Col. GANO that RYBIKOWSKI (formerly head of the German section and one of GANO's best assistants) should be given a Manchurian passport and a cover job in a Japanese Military Attaché's office. At first he had been assigned to Col. ONUCHI's office in Riga. Later when this was closed as a result of the Russian invasion of the Baltic countries, he moved to Stockholm. When he arrived in Sweden there were two other Poles, GIREVITCH and KONAR, working there. They controlled an espionage group in Copenhagen and the original plan had been for all three to remain and work against Germany and Russia. However, GIREVITCH was compromised when one of his agents was arrested by the Swedes in Göteborg and he was obliged to cease his activities, eventually going to England in 1941. RYBIKOWSKI remained as the only P.I.S. representative. In order to secure additional cover he obtained from Finland, where he had contacts in the Finnish police, a false Russian passport in the name of PIOTRE IWANOW. He had previously been using the alias MICHAELOWSKY.

ONODERA worked with him on the most intimate terms until the spring of 1944 and refers to him as his "Chief of Staff." Although RYBIKOWSKI was employed in his office, he allowed him absolute independence in his intelligence activities and deliberately remained ignorant of the details of many of his operations. His two main targets were always Russia and Germany. He never gave ONODERA any information about the western Allies and ONODERA says that he never asked for any.

Working in ONODERA's pay and at his Stockholm office, RYBIKOWSKI received reports from his extensive network of agents situated throughout northeastern Europe and in the USSR and forwarded them via Japanese diplomatic couriers to Polish Headquarters in London. Japanese offices which played a part in this system were located in Germany, the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland. Early in the war Berlin was the most active exchange center; there, another Polish I. S. officer named JAKUBIC or KUNCENICZ had been given a Japanese passport and worked in the Embassy with Attachés MIURA and ISHIDA. In Königsberg the office of the Japanese Consul, SUGIHARA, was used, and in Riga and later in Helsinki that of ONUCHI.

A network of Polish agents who reported to RYBIKOWSKI existed in the cities of Białystok (Poland) and Minsk and Smolensk (Russia), the first having long been a center of Polish intelligence activity against the USSR. Another was under the protection of the Manchurian Consulate General in Warsaw, which remained open after the Japanese Embassy had closed down and until early in 1942. SUGIHARA's office in Königsberg was the headquarters of agents who were in contact with members of the Polish resistance movement at Kaunas, Lithuania.

RYBIKOWSKI had two sources in Finland: ZARA, a newspaperman working in the Polish Legation at Helsinki, who received information from agents in Russia, and POEHONEN of the Finnish I. S. (see below). There were two Polish agents at Narva, Estonia, two at Riga, Latvia, and a group in the Ural and Caucasus regions of eastern and southern Russia. RYBIKOWSKI was unable to establish communications with this group from Stockholm and therefore a description of the organization with a list of the agents' names was sent to Tokyo. ONODERA does not know how this information was used by the Japanese, but he thinks that liaison with the group must have been made by the Japanese Military Attaché in Persia or Turkey and that Gen. ISOMURA (M.A. at Ankara) was probably the one to have responsibility for such liaison at the time.

In August 1941 when General SIKORSKI's London government sent an official mission to Moscow for the first time, a Polish I. S. officer accompanied them. He

SECRET CONTROL

was able to send information back to London whence it went to OMODERA in Stockholm through the Polish diplomatic pouch. This source produced excellent information until 1942 when it was compromised through Russian breaking of Polish codes.

For a summary of the information received by OMODERA from RYBIKOWSKI see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained.

C. OMOUCHI

OMOUCHI's connections with the Polish I. S. were always indirect. He confirms the facts that a working agreement had long existed between the General Staffs of the two countries and that Polish officers worked with Japanese military missions in several European capitals, including Bucharest and Ankara as well as Berlin and Stockholm. At Bucharest a group of several Poles in the Japanese Military Attaché's office gathered information on internal conditions in the USSR: food supplies, industries, communications, etc. They collaborated with Lt. Col. FUJITSUKA until the spring of 1942 and then with Col. SHIMANUKI until the Russian occupation; OMOUCHI heard that some of them were arrested by the Germans and says that Col. HIGUCHI Fukashi (liaison officer in Berlin with Abt II and III of the Abwehr) knows the details of the case.

OMOUCHI's first contact with the Poles occurred when he was stationed in Harbin, on duty with the local Special Service (Tokumu Kikan) unit of the Kwantung Army. Instruction in document analysis as mentioned above and also in cryptanalysis was given there under the direction of Consul KUYATOWSKI (Japanese spelling), assisted by one or two Polish officers who had been sent from Warsaw and who worked under cover as civilian members of the consulate staff. One of these was a document analysis specialist whose name OMOUCHI remembers as resembling "RIPUTSKI." He adds that this was almost surely a cover name, and it is quite possible that it may have been Col. KOWALESKI. Another name remembered in this connection is PAVLOWICZ. The group worked under General YAMAMOTO and Col. SUZUKI and trained Japanese officers specially sent from Tokyo, among them ISHIZEKI Sakae and NOMURA Saburo.

In Latvia OMOUCHI came into contact with RYBIKOWSKI in connection with work which was being organized jointly by the Finnish, Polish and Japanese intelligence services. He had met him formerly in Sweden at NISHIMURA's office. He believes his real name to have been LIBITSKI, though he is not certain of this and says that in all his own dealing with him the name IWANOW was used. At that time RYBIKOWSKI had only Danish and Polish papers and was in need of a passport from a country not occupied by the Germans. OMOUCHI arranged for him to obtain a Manchurian passport through MIARA, Counsellor of the Manchurian Legation in Berlin, the particulars of which were as follows: name, PIOTRE IWANOW; race, Russian; home address, Hailar.

RYBIKOWSKI came to Riga shortly before the Russian invasion of the Baltic States to make contact with a Polish group working for SUGIHARA, Japanese Consul in Kaunas, Lithuania, and to build up a network of Polish agents in Latvia. He succeeded in setting up an organization whose members were located on the Baltic coast in Riga, and on the Russian frontier. It was headed by a former painter whose name OMOUCHI believes was KUBKEWIECZ and whose headquarters were near the frontier. His chief agent in Riga was a Polish woman who worked as a laundress. After RYBIKOWSKI returned to Sweden OMOUCHI forwarded reports from these people and from SUGIHARA to Stockholm. He complains that they were all written in Polish and that he was in no way rewarded for his trouble. In August 1941 OMOUCHI says that the liaison became difficult because a Russian agent was assigned to watch his house.

In Riga OMOUCHI also knew the Polish M. A. Col. BRZESKWINSKI, but the latter was depressed about his country's defeat and did little intelligence work before the Russian invasion made it necessary for him to move to Stockholm.

SECRET CONTROL

At the beginning of ONOUCHI's stay in Finland, RYBIKOWSKI came to Helsinki and cooperated with POETHONEN - assistant to PAASONEN, chief of the Finnish I. S., and a specialist in espionage - in establishing lines to Estonia and Latvia. ONOUCHI obtained the results of their work through the office of SALO-KORPI, one of the leaders of the Finnish cryptoanalysis group. He does not know the details of this activity. He says that it was still going on in 1943 when ONODERA, acting on RYBIKOWSKI's behalf, asked ONOUCHI to have POETHONEN send a liaison man to Stockholm. Later on he found out that POETHONEN had done so.

In Helsinki he knew of the following members of RYBIKOWSKI's organization: ZABA (see above); a Pole about 50 years old described as a slippery character who had fled with the American Minister's party; and an excellent contact in the passport section of the Finnish police. ONOUCHI was in direct contact with ZABA, who was introduced to him by RYBIKOWSKI in October 1940. He obtained from him some information on Finnish politics and internal affairs. ZABA went to Stockholm shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-German war in June 1941.

ONOUCHI's other Polish contacts in Helsinki included a refugee named BERSON, who had been introduced to him by NISHIMURA, and the Polish Military Attaché, Col. LOS. He made repeated attempts to exchange information with the latter but soon found that he was doing no intelligence work. (LOS later moved to Stockholm where he worked for the Polish I. S. against Germany.) He also wanted to meet the Polish Minister, said by NISHIMURA to be exceptionally well informed about Russia, but this man left for Sweden before he could do so. BERSON, who had lived in Moscow, merely gave ONOUCHI some superficial information on Russia.

SECRET CONTROL

2. Finnish and Baltic

a. Finnish

A. BACKGROUND

There had been extensive contacts and exchanges between the Finnish and Japanese intelligence services before OHOUCHI arrived in Helsinki or ONODERA in Stockholm. Their collaboration, as in the case of the Polish-Japanese relationship, had originated in the days of the Russo-Japanese War and had always focused on work against the USSR: it had been given an historical foundation in theories of racial kinship. Because of the relative inactivity of the Finnish I. S. before 1934, however, it had remained largely superficial until in that year Col. TERADA was appointed the first Japanese Military Attaché to Helsinki. He and his successor Col. KATO laid the groundwork for the more intimate collaboration which began with the arrival of Col. NISHIMURA in 1938.

Relationship between the two services was on a strictly military basis and was kept secret; according to OHOUCHI, none of the Finnish political leaders or even President RYTTI knew about it. Work was carried out on an exchange basis. The Finns gave the Japanese instruction in crypto-analysis and access to all types of intelligence on the USSR, and the Japanese gave money (through payments made to the Finnish Military Attaché in Tokyo) and a certain amount of Soviet intelligence and intercept material obtained in Asia.

In 1939 and 1940, as a result of the Soviet threat to the high secrecy of activities being carried on in Finland, the center of espionage and sabotage collaboration between the Finns and the Japanese moved to NISHIMURA's office in Stockholm. At the end of the Russo-Finnish war in March 1940 it returned to Helsinki. At this time, the Poles too collaborating, RYBIKOWSKI went to Riga (see above).

During the same period, as a result of negotiations initiated by NISHIMURA, the Kwantung Army requested of the Finnish General Staff that two Finnish officers be sent to the Far East to teach methods of winter warfare. The Finns agreed and sent Col. KAILA, an outstanding specialist on the subject who had commanded the 4th Division on the Mannerheim Line during the war, and an assistant, Major REINER, an artillery officer. They traveled through the United States and arrived in Japan in November 1940. In Manchuria they worked with Col. KOTANI Etsuo (chief of the Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section) and Col. KATO Yoshihide. They were prevented from returning by the outbreak of war between the USSR and Germany, and remained in Japan as military attachés. According to OHOUCHI, they were still (at the time of his interrogation) in Tokyo, where he had last seen them on the street in July 1945.

In studying the Russo-Finnish war and in conversations with the Finnish War Minister, NISHIMURA discovered that perhaps the most important cause of the Finnish successes against the Soviet armies had been the crypto-analytical service under Col. HALLAMAA. It had succeeded in breaking the codes used in Soviet combat communications so rapidly that it could communicate Soviet orders to Finnish unit commanders before they reached their destination in the Soviet lines. NISHIMURA determined to acquire this valuable weapon for the Japanese services. He consulted with HALLAMAA and worked out an arrangement whereby a specially designated Japanese officer would be assigned to the Finnish crypto-analytical section for the purpose of learning their methods. The Japanese paid for this privilege with money of which the Finns were sorely in need as a result of the war, and with Russian cipher material -- five digit -- obtained in the Far East and forwarded by Tokyo.

The appointment to NISHIMURA's office in 1940 of Col. HORIUCHI and a naval officer whose name ONODERA cannot recall was the immediate result of this agreement. HORIUCHI, who had had no previous training in such matters, proved unequal to the task and was replaced in 1941 by Col. HIROSE Eichi, a trained specialist who remained until the closing of OHOUCHI's office in 1944.

SECRET CONTROL

B. ONUUCHI

NISHIMURA's assistant, NINOMIYA, introduced ONUUCHI to Finnish General Staff circles. His work with the General Staff began at once and continued without interruption throughout his period of duty (Sept. 1940 - Sept. 1944). He made the following trips and inspections in connection with it:

1. February 1941.  
Inspection of the Suomusalmi battle fields  
for the study of winter warfare.
2. September 1941.  
Inspection of the front in the Kanas sector.
3. November 1941.  
Inspection of the front in Karelia. HIROSE  
replaced ONUUCHI on this trip.
4. April 1942.  
Inspection of the central Karelian front.
5. April (?) 1942.  
Visit to plane factory at Tammerbors.
6. June 1942.  
Visit to Finnish General Staff Headquarters  
at Mikkeli. Inspection of the underground  
installations of the General Headquarters.
7. November 1943.  
Inspection of fortifications, tour of northern  
Finland as far as Rokniemi.
8. February 1944.  
Accompaniment of Japanese military, air and  
naval mission headed by Col. KOTANI to  
inspect German Air Force winter installations  
in northern Finland.
9. July 1944.  
Accompaniment of Japanese Doctor KOMORI of the  
Berlin Embassy to inspect an army hospital in  
central Finland.
10. July 1944.  
Visit to Finnish General Headquarters at Mikkeli.
11. July 1944.  
Visit to Hango.

In February 1944 a Finnish-Japanese intelligence conference was held in Helsinki. The Japanese were represented by ONUUCHI, HIROSE, and Col. ISHIZUKA, a technical intelligence specialist sent from the Berlin Embassy. The following Finns attended: Col. PAASONEN, chief of Department II; Col. SOMERTO, chief of the positive intelligence section; Col. KOEKONEN, his assistant; Major RANTANEN, air specialist of the estimates section; and Capt. SALOKORPI of the espionage section. They discussed Russian military developments, industry, and war production capacity. ISHIZUKA brought with him German technical reports from Berlin. The conference concluded that the defeat of Germany was inevitable.

Department II of the Finnish General Staff was located in Helsinki at the time of ONUUCHI's arrival. When the General Staff moved to Mikkeli in June 1941, the operational section of Department II went with it but the offices with which ONUUCHI was in contact left representatives in Helsinki. His account of the over-all organization is as follows:

Department II: Chief, Gen. MELANDER;  
Assistant, Col. ENKEL.

SECRET CONTROL

Positive Intelligence Section:  
Chief, Col. POEHONEN.  
Estimates Section: Chief, Col. KOEKKONEN.  
Crypto-Analysis and Monitoring Section:  
Chief, Col. HALLAMAA;  
Assistant, Capt. PALE.  
Espionage and Sabotage Section:  
Chiefs, Lt. Col. SANTAVUORI and  
Capt. SALOKORPI;  
Assistant, Lt. RUMELA.  
Counter Intelligence Section:  
Chief, Col. WALDEN;  
Assistant, RAUTSUO.  
Liaison Section:  
Chief, Col. ROSENREUER;  
Assistant, Col. SLOEOR

In July 1941 MELANDER was succeeded by Col. PAASONEN (whom ONUUCHI did not meet until 1944), a confidant of MANNERHEIM and President RYTTI, whose family lived in the latter's official residence. PAASONEN was half Hungarian, married to a Hungarian, and graduate of Saint Cyr. He did not get on well with POEHONEN and in 1942 replaced him with Col. SOMERTO, who had been Finnish Military Attaché at Moscow in 1939. SOMERTO in turn was succeeded by Col. KOEKKONEN in June 1944.

POEHONEN was ONUUCHI's closest contact in the Finnish General Staff. He was a specialist in training and dispatching espionage and sabotage agents against Russia. He spoke the language well, had studied the subject for many years and was much looked up to in Finnish military circles. ONUUCHI describes him as a daring, positive worker with great ability for gathering intelligence and only one weak point - in evaluation - which is said to have caused his downfall with PAASONEN.

They exchanged information and worked together in planning operations. POEHONEN's headquarters were divided between Helsinki and Mikkeli. ONUUCHI never visited the latter place but was in regular contact with the Helsinki office. For a time this was under the direction of Lt. Col. SANTAVUORI; ONUUCHI's contacts, however, were either with POEHONEN himself or with Capt. SALOKORPI and his assistant, Lt. RUMELA (who worked on Soviet radio activities). SALOKORPI was a specialist in espionage and in charge of the fabrication of false papers. When POEHONEN was transferred, SALOKORPI handled all of ONUUCHI's contacts with Department II. (For a description of the material received by ONUUCHI from POEHONEN and his section, see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained.)

Apart from the Finnish General Staff, ONUUCHI had a personal source of intelligence and several official contacts among the Finns at Helsinki. The intelligence source was a lawyer named SHIHIMAN (Japanese spelling), who had been employed for several years at the Japanese Legation until he was dismissed by Minister SAKAYA. He supplied ONUUCHI with reports on internal conditions in Finland and received from him a monthly salary of 3000 Finnish Marks (300 Yen), increased in 1943 to 5000 Marks.

The other contacts were with the following Finnish officials, who ONUUCHI claims were in no way connected with intelligence and from whom he says he never obtained information:

HARKKARIHEN - Section Chief in the Foreign Office who was in charge of liaison with Japanese diplomats.  
NISSONEN - An employee of the Foreign Office from whom ONUUCHI received official invitations, visas, ration coupons, etc.  
Dr. RAMSTEAD (probable spelling; Japanese version is RAMUSUTEDDO) - A former Finnish minister to Japan, and language professor in the Finnish university. He was president of the Japanese-Finnish Society, honorary president of which was the Japanese minister. While ONUUCHI was in Helsinki this society held one staff meeting a year; other meetings were cancelled because of the war. He knows nothing of its membership, no list of which had been published since 1939.

~~SECRET CONTROL~~

ONOUCHI obtained some information about Finnish political developments and internal conditions from the Japanese minister, whose source was an ex-member of the Foreign Office named LAUTKARI, then on the staff of the Finnish newspaper Kauppalahkki (Japanese spelling). This information was particularly interesting in February 1944 during the period which preceded the peace negotiations, and again in August of the same year with regard to the peace terms.

C. HIROSE

A valuable General Staff contact and working arrangement with which ONOUCHI was not directly associated was maintained for three years by his subordinate, Assistant Military Attaché HIROSE Eiichi, who until the beginning of 1944 had no other duties in the Military Attaché's office than to write reports on crypto-analysis for Tokyo Headquarters. HIROSE was sent to Finland specifically to cooperate with the Crypto-analysis Section of Department II, a mission considered as highly secret and personal. Not even the Japanese Minister to Finland was aware that he was anything more than a routine Ass't M.A. For administrative purposes he was attached to the Japanese War Ministry, but his directives were communicated to him personally from the Central Special Intelligence Section. Except for matters of office routine he was entirely independent of ONOUCHI.

Immediately after his arrival in Finland in the spring of 1941 HIROSE was taken to Grankura, a naval monitoring and crypto-analysis station located about 40 kilometers west of Helsinki. It was commanded by Capt. POKARINEN with a staff of about 100. This station concentrated on interception and deciphering of Soviet messages originating in the Baltic area, particularly those from the main Soviet naval base.

At the beginning of July HIROSE was taken to General Staff Headquarters at Mikkeli and introduced to Col. HALLAMAA, who took him to the Army crypto-analysis center at Savonlinna. There he met the Finnish officers who were to direct and assist him in his study of Soviet codes: Lt. (later Capt.) PALE, next to HALLAMAA the best Finnish crypto-analyst, who worked on the codes of all nations but who was handicapped by a lack of knowledge of Russian; Capt. PARKO, another crypto-analyst; BOGOJABLENSKI, a White Russian refugee who had taken Finnish nationality. HIROSE is not sure who commanded the Savonlinna center but says that it came directly under the authority of HALLAMAA in Mikkeli; it too had a staff of about 100.

In December 1941 the Grankura and Savonlinna stations were amalgamated and their personnel and equipment transferred to Soldavala on the shore of Lake Ladoga. Capt. PARKO was put in command of the new center and PALE became chief of the crypto-analysis services. HIROSE says that the total staff was about 500 men, including 200 signal operators. This number included several Russian refugees whose knowledge of the language was of considerable assistance to the Finns.

Except for periods of report-writing at the M.A.'s office in Helsinki, HIROSE spent all his time at Soldavala until early in 1944 when he was told by the Finns that, as a result of an order by MANNERHEIM which applied to all foreigners, he was no longer authorized to go there. He thinks that the real reason for breaking off cooperation may have been that the Japanese were not supplying enough material to the Finns. The development of the war at that stage may also have been a contributing factor, since contacts between the Finns and the Soviets for the purpose of arranging a separate peace had already begun. (For comments on the results of HIROSE's collaboration in crypto-analysis, see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained.)

While on duty in Finland HIROSE made a number of trips to other European countries. He went to Stockholm three or four times a year to buy living necessities not available in Helsinki, and about once a year traveled to Berlin with occasional side trips to places with which he was unfamiliar:

- 1941 - Berlin for health reasons.
- 1942, February - Berlin; Budapest for a conference with crypto-analyst SAKURAI.
- 1942, September - the Stalingrad front with a delegation of Japanese military engineers. He says that he was on leave at this time and went along out of curiosity.
- 1943, October - Berlin, Budapest (where he again saw SAKURAI), Sophia and Bucharest.
- 1944, August - Berlin to observe conditions in Germany after the

opening of the second front.

In July 1943 an assistant was unexpectedly assigned to him from Budapest: HAGATA Kozamon, civilian graduate of the Foreign Office Language School who had been working under SAKURAI. HAGATA was trained in the Russian language but did not speak it. HIROSE says that he was not able to be of much assistance in crypto-analytical work because of inexperience due to a long period of inactivity in Budapest.

D. ONODERA

As Military Attaché in Riga (1936-1938) ONODERA had been in touch with the Finnish I. S. and had come to know both PAASONEN and HALLAMAA. Inasmuch as all the countries in the Baltic area were associated in obtaining information about their powerful eastern neighbor, the F.I.S. had been aware of ONODERA's already existing relationship with the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian General Staffs (see below). During the early part of his stay in Stockholm he had no direct relationship with the Finnish service -- that being within the province of ONUCHII -- but PAASONEN and HALLAMAA made it apparent that they did not want to lose their personal contact with him and he continued to keep in touch with them through Capt. WILLMAN, the Finnish Naval Attaché at Stockholm.

Besides receiving general reports on the situation at the Russo-Finnish front from ONUCHII, who sent them regularly and who also visited Sweden about fifteen times during the war, ONODERA kept abreast of the Finns by working with WILLMAN and with Col. STEVEN, the Military Attaché. STEVEN was one of his most productive sources during the first part of the war; he was a personal friend of the Crown Prince and had excellent contacts with Swedish officers in the General Staff. Among these was Major PETERSEN of the Espionage Section; ONODERA believes that he had STEVEN worked closely together until near the end of the war when they quarrelled and STEVEN began speaking against him. STEVEN disliked the Germans and avoided the Military Attaché VON UTHMANN, but he was always friendly to the Japanese. He was unpopular with many of his compatriots: HALLAMAA distrusted him and warned ONODERA against him.

ONODERA got intelligence from him (see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained) by exchange and by purchase. He says that he was astonished when the official representative of Finland asked to be paid for this information. He says that STEVEN received 1000 Kroner for a report on three or four occasions. ONODERA also gave him Russian material and general estimates on the progress of the war. STEVEN wrote his reports in Swedish, the only foreign language which he spoke fluently.

Although the information which WILLMAN supplied was less extensive, ONODERA regarded him as more intelligent and honorable than STEVEN. His chief source was the Finnish General Staff; he probably also had good personal sources in Sweden. Although he was in touch with British and American officials he never gave ONODERA any information concerning the western Allies. To ONODERA's knowledge he did not work with CELLARIUS (see below) or any other German I. S. representative.

ONODERA was also in touch with Capt. HORNIGREN, WILLMAN's predecessor as Naval Attaché; they exchanged some information. ONODERA believes that HORNIGREN had, in one of the three Baltic countries, a source of information on Soviet naval activity which

In August 1944 ONODERA heard from his Finnish friends of the imminent peace between their country and the USSR. He immediately made contact with PAASONEN and HALLAMAA through WILLMAN and undertook to do what he could to protect and help the Finnish services. About that time a group of more than a thousand Finnish intelligence operators -- including a special service parachute battalion of 400 men -- secretly came over the frontier into Sweden, bringing with them their radio equipment and their archives. This undertaking was given the active support of the Swedish Army, which assigned Major PETERSEN to carry out the details. The Finnish group continued its former activities, setting up a crypto-analytical section near Stockholm and operating three or four monitoring stations in northern Sweden. It was in direct communication with the Finnish resistance movement.

SECRET CONTROL

ONODERA says that in spite of what was done for these Finnish exiles by the Swedes, they were desperately in need of money and were not even able to apply for help to their traditional friends, the Americans. Accordingly, his efforts in their behalf took the form of financing them to the extent of about 250,000 - 300,000 Kroner -- his entire funds including War Ministry money, which he later had to replace. He had promised more and had received an additional 150,000 Kroner from Tokyo for this special purpose when the war ended before he could deliver it to them. He says that, although the information which he received at the time was in no way commensurate with the amount expended, he considered it an excellent investment for the future from the Japanese point of view.

ONODERA received intelligence from the Finns in two ways, through personal contacts and in written reports. HALLAMAA and PAASONEN both visited him separately on two occasions. They brought him no particular item of information but came to discuss the progress of the war in general, the situation of the Finnish refugee group in Sweden and the development of their mutual collaboration. When they were both absent from Stockholm, PALE was their representative and carried out their instructions. He was HALLAMAA's most outstanding crypto-analyst and at the same time the guardian and archivist of the files and equipment which the refugee group had brought with them. Col. KOEKOMIEN also came with reports from Finland three or four times. He had been Finnish Military Attaché in Moscow and was, with SALOHORPI, in charge of HALLAMAA's agents behind the Russian lines. KAIMUS, a Latvian radio engineer and crypto-analyst (considered second only to PALE) who had worked in Berlin before joining the HALLAMAA group, was also in touch with ONODERA and MAASING (see below).

Over a period of about ten months written reports were delivered to ONODERA weekly, usually on Mondays, by WILLMAN or by Mrs. MARKKUNEN, an employee of the Finnish Legation. The information contained in these reports (see below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained) reached Stockholm in three different ways:

- a. By radio. The Finnish Legation had a W/T set which was in touch with Finland. (ONODERA believes that this was operated with the knowledge and tacit consent of the Swedes). In this case the reports were usually written up by WILLMAN, PALE, or KOEKOMIEN in Stockholm.
- b. By the Finnish diplomatic courier.
- c. By clandestine frontier crossers. This method was used mostly in 1945. ONODERA believes that they were secretly assisted by the Swedes (probably Major PETERSEN), but he knows no further details.

ONODERA also had a Finnish source which was in no way connected with his relationship to the General Staff: a former police officer named KUNENIUS who had collaborated with the German CELLARIUS during the first part of the war and who came to Stockholm as a refugee late in 1944. ONODERA employed him as a general informant for counter-espionage purposes. KUNENIUS supplied American publications, acted as intermediary between ONODERA and prospective agents and, since he was working simultaneously for HORN and SALZINGER of the German I. S., gave the latest information on German activities. ONODERA paid him a total of about 10,000 Kroner for his work.

b. Baltic

A. ONODERA

Of all ONODERA's sources at Stockholm, the best came from Estonia and the other two Baltic republics. His contacts with them had been founded on his collaboration with intelligence officers of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian

SECRET CONTROL

General Staffs in 1936-1938 when he was Military Attaché in Riga. During those years he had formed personal friendships with several of the officers and worked very closely with them in obtaining intelligence on the USSR. Acting in the name of the Japanese General Staff, he had succeeded in making an agreement with Col. MAASING, Chief of Department II of the Estonian General Staff, to set up a joint Japanese-Estonian organization through which Estonian agents recruited by the E.I.S. were briefed by the Japanese Military Attaché, returned to the E.I.S. for further training and then sent into Russia. Resulting intelligence was to be shared by both countries.

In 1938, as part of this system, ONODERA supplied the E.I.S. with 16,000 Marks for the purchase of a speed boat to be used on Lake PEIPUS for taking operatives to and from Russia. He says that one of the agents of the joint organization was an Estonian officer on the Soviet General Staff who provided excellent information until the end of 1939, first from Moscow and later from Khabarovsk. Another was dispatched to Manchuria and was supposed eventually to report to Japan; however, he failed in his mission.

Two of ONODERA's closest collaborators in this undertaking were Major KRISTIAN and Col. SAARSEN. The former, in charge of the Estonian service's two training centers for agents, ran an espionage net inside Russia, the members of which were Estonians located in the following places: Leningrad (a small group the chief of which was a doctor); Moscow; the Volga region (among the Estonian colonies); and eastern Siberia. The latter, who later succeeded MAASING as head of the E.I.S., also had sources in Russia.

ONODERA was recalled before he was able, himself, to witness the full results obtained from this organization. However, he says that it was so successful that whereas his predecessor, Col. T. OUCHI, had sent forty cabled reports to Tokyo and ONODERA two hundred, his successor Col. T. TARATSUKI sent three hundred in a shorter time than either of them. ONODERA was highly complimented on this fact when he returned to Tokyo.

A similar joint arrangement was made by ONODERA with Col. KIKKUS, chief of Department II of the Latvian General Staff, who had an espionage training school located at Dunaibrück (Daugavpils) and a small organization which operated in Ostrov, Pskov, and the neighboring frontier region. His assistant was Lt. Col. PETERSON, succeeded by Lt. Col. ZERMINS. After the Russians occupied Latvia in 1940 they discovered this organization and ZERMINS committed suicide. PETERSON fled to Germany, where he fought through the war as an officer in the German army not connected with the Abwehr or the S.D. KIKKUS took refuge in Stockholm.

BIRZINS, Latvian Minister of the Interior and Chief of the "Latvian Volunteer Corps", also worked with ONODERA, who says that he is unusually intelligent and well informed on Russian matters. After the invasion he went first to Finland and then to Stockholm. There he came into contact with CHODERA's predecessor, Col. NISHIMURA, who introduced him to YAMAMOTO of the Berlin Embassy as a man who could be valuable to the Abwehr in work against Russia. However, the Germans were against BIRZINS because his volunteer corps had opposed the German inspired Latvian National Socialist movement, and he was finally arrested by the S.S. In spite of efforts made to secure his release, he disappeared. ONODERA says in this connection that the intermediary most frequently used by the Japanese in Berlin for obtaining special favors from the S.S. was Frau Von ROSESTEIN, wife of a Latvian General who had been captured by the Russians.

During the war the Estonian and Latvian General Staffs were disbanded and the officers whom ONODERA had known became scattered, either living as refugees in Sweden or working for the Finns and the Germans. However, he managed to keep in touch with them for collaboration whenever they were in a position to be useful to him. If their families were in financial difficulties he helped them with funds and other necessities which could be obtained more easily in Sweden than elsewhere. By this means he strengthened the friendships which he had already formed and obtained some of his most interesting information from quarters which other Japanese observers in Europe were unable to touch.

SECRET CONTROL

ONODERA's closest and best collaborator was Col. MAASING. A former officer in the Czarist armies who had graduated from the MINSK Military Academy and fought in World War I as a captain, MAASING was chief of the Estonian I.S. during the period of ONODERA's service in Riga. Shortly before the Soviet invasion he moved to Stockholm where, as Estonian Military Attaché, he continued to direct Estonian espionage against the USSR. In 1941 he joined the Germans, working with CELLARIUS in "Gruppe E" and with other Abwehr sections on the Eastern front. Throughout this period he always reported to ONODERA through ONUUCHI and the Japanese diplomatic pouch. In April 1942, at ONODERA's suggestion, he broke contact with the Germans and Finns and returned to Stockholm ostensibly as a civilian but actually to become ONODERA's chief independent collaborator (in contrast with RYDNIOWSKI, who worked as an employee within the Japanese Military Attaché organization).

ONODERA, who had helped MAASING's family while he was absent in Finland and Germany, gave him a monthly salary of between 1,000 and 1,500 Kroner and also occasional presents. From Stockholm he continued to direct his espionage organization against the Soviet Union, using agents located in Estonia, Latvia, Leningrad and Moscow. They were mostly Estonians from all walks of life and included Communist Party members. Among them were some of his former colleagues of the Estonian General Staff who had been captured and taken to Russia, like Col. TÖMBERG of the Estonian Air Force, whom the Soviets put to work teaching in a military academy. ONODERA implies that TÖMBERG gave excellent information. General RAJUNIA, former Estonian Chief of Staff, and General UDEWS, Chief of Operations, were in similar situations. MAASING told ONODERA that most of the senior Estonian officers had been given such assignments by the Soviets. He communicated with this organization by means of agents among the crews of Soviet ships.

Although he was anti-German, MAASING had a number of sources within Germany. He was a friend of Admiral CANARIS, who held him in high regard. ONODERA says that in 1944, shortly before CANARIS fell into disgrace, he wrote MAASING a letter in which he described the position of Germany as being desperate and proposed that steps be taken immediately to create an organization for the future. MAASING's chief source in Germany was the Estonian Col. JACOBSEN, who was able to furnish good information because of his special position in the Abwehr. General SAIDRA of the S.S. was also an informant. Another was Col. GROSSMAN, an Estonian who had attended the Ecole de Guerre in Paris and was active during the war in Upsala and in Germany.

MAASING had excellent connections among officers of the Swedish army because, in the pre-war days when he was chief of the E.I.S., the Swedish General Staff had sent some of their officers to study under him. Col. JUULIN-DANNEFIELD recently appointed Chief of the Swedish I.S. and former Military Attaché in Berlin, and Col. KAEMPF, also of the S.I.S., were among his former pupils. General JUNG was a friend of MAASING, who was also very close to Major PETERSEN. ONODERA believes that in addition he had valuable contacts within the Swedish crypto-analytical section, probably among Finns who had transferred from HALLAMAA's service. He was in close touch with the Swedish State Police, which he had been instrumental in organizing before the war. This organization functions under the Ministry of the Interior and is responsible for civil counter espionage. MAASING's contact was with PALMGREN (?), one of its directors.

Among the Finns, MAASING's best friend was General EELANDER. HALLAMAA was hostile to EELANDER because the latter had "deserted" the alliance of Baltic nations in 1942 at a crucial moment. Later this fact was forgotten and at the end of 1945 they were working together again.

MAASING also had a number of sources among the western Allies. The best was GARNIER, the French (Gaullist) Assistant Military Attaché. Since GARNIER was inexperienced and did not have sufficient funds to pay MAASING for intelligence received, he supplied information on his own country. ONODERA describes him as stupid and says that he was well aware of MAASING's connection with the Japanese, even trying to use him to obtain ONODERA's help in getting from KRAEMER the names of French agents in German employ. ONODERA of course refused. MAASING's other allied contacts were the American Consul, CARLSON (ONODERA distinguishes

SECRET CONTROL

between Consul CARLSON and an American intelligence operative of the same name) and the Englishmen HICKEBING (?) and CHESHIRE. (For a description of the material which ONODERA received from MAASING, see below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained.)

Another close friend of ONODERA from the Riga days was Col. JACOBSEN, described as a very clever man who was interested above all in politics and diplomatic intrigue. After the Soviet invasion he fled to Germany. Being a friend of CANARIS, he was taken into the Abwehr and used for special missions in the Baltic countries and occupied Russia. He was in touch with MAASING, but independently of that fact he sent ONODERA occasional reports on the political situation in Germany. When CANARIS was disgraced, JACOBSEN was left jobless in Berlin and ONODERA helped him and his family with money and supplies from Stockholm.

He had excellent contacts in Sweden. ONODERA believes that he was responsible for the original contact between CANARIS and Col. ALDERKREUTZ, the head of the Swedish I.S. He was also a close friend of JUHLIN-DAHNEFELD, who forwarded his letters to ONODERA through the Swedish diplomatic pouch. At the end of the war he was interned in FLensburg. He had gone there in an attempt to reach Stockholm where he still had some assets. He had formerly been a wealthy man, but his property in Estonia had been confiscated and his belongings in Berlin destroyed by bombing.

ONODERA's remaining contacts among the Estonians included Col. SAAPSEK, Maj. KRISTIAN and Alexei de BELLEGARDE. MAASING's successor as head of the Estonian I.S., SAARSEK is described by ONODERA as his most intimate Estonian friend. He worked for the Germans throughout the war, though not always at their bidding, and kept in touch with ONODERA. He had excellent contacts with the Poles.

KRISTIAN (see also below, B.) whom ONODERA has known for ten years, was largely responsible through his ability to handle espionage agents for the success of the joint Japanese-Estonian penetration of the USSR which was organized before the war. After serving as Estonian Military Attaché in Finland in 1940-1941 and later working for the Abwehr, he came to Stockholm in 1944 and offered to work for ONODERA. The latter gave him a year's living expenses out of gratitude for his former services but says that KRISTIAN had changed markedly over the years and was no longer trustworthy; therefore, the offer was refused. ONODERA states emphatically that he did not receive any intelligence from KRISTIAN at this time or at any other time during the war.

BELLEGARDE was an exception among ONODERA's Estonian sources because he was not connected with the General Staff, and ONODERA had not known him before the war. They first met in August 1942 at ONODERA's Stockholm office to which BELLEGARDE came from Germany with a card of introduction from JACOBSEN, whom ONODERA had previously asked for sources on England and America. BELLEGARDE continued to work in and out of Germany for the Abwehr, meanwhile visiting Sweden from time to time and reporting to ONODERA on German activities. Early in 1944 he moved his household from Berlin to Stockholm. Planning to go to England, he proposed to ONODERA that he act there as an agent for the Japanese. ONODERA says that in spite of the fact that he was distrustful of BELLEGARDE he agreed to the proposal because he had no direct contact in Great Britain and the risk from his standpoint was not great. BELLEGARDE left in September 1944 and from then until the end of the war reported regularly, even arranging to have the New York Times overseas edition sent to ONODERA once a week. (See below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained.)

B. OHOUCHI

While OHOUCHI was stationed in Riga (1939-1940) he carried on the espionage operations initiated jointly by his predecessors, ONODERA and TAKATSUKI, with Col. MAASING, head of Department II of the Estonian General Staff.

His chief collaborator was Major KRISTIAN, who ran a training center near Tallinn and directed all recruiting, training, and dispatching of agents. Just before the Soviet invasion KRISTIAN went to Helsinki as Estonian Military Attaché and began to work with the CELLARIUS Abwehr organization. In August 1940, because of Russian threats, he moved to Stockholm and then to Berlin where he spent six months working in Abt II and III of the Abwehr. After June 1941 he returned to Finland to run an espionage and sabotage training center for Es-

SECRET CONTROL

tonians about 30 kilometers from Helsinki, and resumed his contacts with ONUUCHI and CELLARHUS. At Riga ONUUCHI received intelligence obtained from the activity of E.I.S. agents in Russia. In his reports to Tokyo this was referred to as "KO" ("A") type intelligence. In return he gave exchange material supplied by Tokyo and collaborated in the briefing of agents. He also paid the equivalent of 500 Yen monthly to the Estonian General Staff through KRISTIAN -- at first in pounds sterling and later in dollars. Shortly before his departure for Helsinki in September 1940 he supplied the last installment of funds for the purchase of a motor boat bought in separate parts by the Japanese Military Attaché's office in Berlin and shipped to Estonia by courier. This was the boat used for the transfer of agents across Lake Peipus. ONUUCHI later heard that it was employed throughout the Soviet occupation and later when the Germans entered the country in July 1941.

At Helsinki ONUUCHI lost direct contact with the Estonian General Staff, whose officers were scattered through Germany and the Scandinavian countries. However, he kept in touch with KRISTIAN and bought from him reports on the USSR for 5000 Finnish Marks apiece. ONUUCHI had another Estonian contact in Admiral PITTKA, who sold him reports on political conditions in Estonia under the Soviet occupation.

In the case of the Latvian General Staff ONUUCHI again inherited at Riga the situation which had been built up by OHODERA and TAKATSUKI. He worked with Col. KIKKUS, who later fled to Stockholm, and with Lt. Col. ZEMIHS, who committed suicide in July 1941.

They cooperated on an espionage system similar to that conducted by the Japanese and the Estonian I.S. The information which ONUUCHI received as a result was referred to in reports to Tokyo as "OTSU" ("B") type. On the whole, it was inferior in quality and quantity to what was obtained from the Estonians. In exchange for it ONUUCHI gave advice in the training of agents, Soviet intelligence sent from Tokyo and the monthly equivalent of 800 Yen, which went to the General Staff through KIKKUS.

SECRET CONTROL

3. German

(For further details see "Japanese Wartime Collaboration with the German Intelligence Service," SSU, 4 October 1946. DB #1259.)

A. OHODERA

OHODERA says that he had never liked the Germans and disagreed with their conduct of the war from its very beginning. His own contacts with them and what he heard later from his Finnish and Estonian friends only tended to confirm his earlier estimate. In spite of the fact that Japan and Germany were allies, he never succeeded in working with German intelligence organizations as he did with the Finns and the Estonians. His best German sources were all the outgrowth of personal friendships. He explains this by saying that the Abwehr representatives in the Scandinavian countries, with the exception of KRAEIER, were primarily interested in counter-espionage, whereas his own main objective was positive intelligence. German suspicion of the activities of RYRIKOWSKI in his office and his own experiences with WAGNER and DELLEGENDRE were also causes of considerable mutual distrust. There follow brief descriptions of his relationships with various German personalities; for the results of his work with them see below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained.

a. Admiral CANARIS. OHODERA first met the chief of the Abwehr while, as Military Attaché at Riga, he was on a trip in Estonia with OSNIIA. He remembers the date as that of the execution of Marshal TUKLAICHESKI, Kremlin-purged Red Army leader (12 June 1937).

During the war they saw each other briefly whenever they were in Berlin at the same time, discussing the overall war situation and the needs of their respective intelligence services. OHODERA says that they got along well with each other and became close friends. A further bond between them was created by the fact that CANARIS was also friend of MAASING, JACOBSEN and HELANDER.

At OHODERA's request CANARIS sent him OKW reports in their original form without the usual censorship by the Attaché Department. OHODERA passed these on to the office of Gen. KONATSU, the Military Attaché at Berlin. KONATSU considered this contact with CANARIS to be most valuable because the Japanese in Berlin otherwise received only material which had lost its value through security processing before it reached them. Such a situation had existed since KONATSU's arrival in Berlin early in 1943, when previous direct collaboration between Ambassador OSNIIA and the Abwehr was broken off by the Germans.

b. Karl Heinz KRAEIER. Although socially he knew KRAEIER - one of the Abwehr's most successful operators - as early as 1943, OHODERA did not begin to work with him until August 1944 when they were brought together by VON HEINEMANN, the German Air Attaché who had been recalled from Stockholm to Berlin. From that time on they collaborated closely and OHODERA considers KRAEIER to have been one of his most valuable sources. They met once a week either in the German Embassy or in the office of OHODERA, and from time to time in the apartment of one of the latter's assistants. WENZLAU, a Russian specialist, who had joined KRAEIER in 1944, was often present. OHODERA always went alone. He says that he revealed some of his own sources but usually in an indirect manner so as somewhat to camouflage them. However, KRAEIER revealed none of his except official German Air Force publications.

c. Dr. (Col.) Hans WAGNER. Chief in Stockholm of Abwehr K.O. Schweden. He first made contact with OHODERA on CANARIS's orders at the beginning of 1941. From that time on they met occasionally when WAGNER had received material from Berlin with instructions to pass it on to OHODERA. They did not get along. OHODERA knows that WAGNER made several attempts to penetrate his office and even tried to bribe the maid servants in his home. However, he does not believe that his efforts were successful.

MAASING, who knew WAGNER's organization, had a low opinion of his abilities, as did most of the other Germans in Stockholm. This was one of the reasons why ONODERA made direct contact with Ast Oslo instead of going through WAGNER as he should have done. To keep up appearances ONODERA sometimes officially asked WAGNER for counter-espionage or security information as, for instance, in the case of BELLEGARDE. However, the answers were never satisfactory. WAGNER always promised a great deal but never produced anything of interest. ONODERA claims to know almost nothing about UTERMARK, WAGNER's assistant, whom he merely saw once or twice when UTERMARK came to deliver messages at his office. After the July 20th (1944) plot against Hitler, ONODERA was told in Oslo by SALZINGER of Abwehr III F that UTERMARK had superseded WAGNER in K.O. Schweden because he had good connections in the S.D.

d. Colonel VON HEINEMANN, Air Attaché at the German Legation. Born in the Baltic region, he was a Russian specialist who spoke the language fluently. ONODERA began to exchange intelligence with him in the summer of 1942. He gave Soviet military material and received from VON HEINEMANN information on the American and British air forces and on Soviet war industries, all of which came from official German Air Force publications. Generally speaking, the information was good.

VON HEINEMANN had many friends among the Swedes. ONODERA believes that he exchanged information with General JUNGBAHL, Chief of Staff of the Swedish Air Force. He was recalled to Berlin in October 1944 and shortly before his departure he initiated the exchanges between ONODERA and KRAMER, who had been working with him. ONODERA never established anything more than a social relation with his successor, Colonel GOLCHER.

e. Major VON ROSENBLATT, German Assistant Air Attaché. He had frequent contact with ONODERA. They did not make official exchanges of information but VON ROSENBLATT, an aircraft engineer, kept ONODERA supplied with material on the latest German technical developments. He was born in Finland and spoke Russian fluently.

f. Colonel VON UTHEMANN, Military Attaché. He was ONODERA's closest official contact among the Germans. They did not exchange material but met about once a month to discuss intelligence matters and the over-all problems of the war, each giving his opinion of future developments. VON UTHEMANN's job was devoted almost entirely to exploiting contacts in Swedish military circles and he therefore did not have much information of interest to ONODERA.

g. CELLARIUS. For the first three years of the war there was no direct contact between ONODERA and CELLARIUS. During early and successful operation with "Gruppe E" of the Abwehr, CELLARIUS forbade the officers working with him to have any contact with ONODERA because of the latter's employment of RYBIKOWSKI. Nevertheless, ONODERA was kept informed of his activities by MAASING through KALJUS, who frequently travelled from Estonia to Finland and gave ONOUCHI reports which were in turn forwarded to Stockholm by courier. In 1944 ONODERA found out through SAARSEN that CELLARIUS was trying to organize counter-espionage activities against the Poles in Finland. In October 1944 HORN, CELLARIUS's assistant, made contact with ONODERA on his chief's behalf. He proposed that ONODERA act as an intermediary for messages between CELLARIUS and certain members of the Finnish I.S., including HALLAMA. However, the plan fell through and ONODERA states that he received no information from CELLARIUS at any time, nor did he ever have any more direct connection with him than has been stated.

h. Other Contacts. Throughout the war ONODERA made regular trips to Norway at the invitation of the German Commander-in-Chief, General VON FALKENHORST. In 1942 he went on an official tour of the northern zone in the company of other Axis Attachés from Stockholm, among them Colonel GARBEA (Rumanian) and Colonel ROERO (Italian). In 1943 he was personally invited to visit the German military installations and was guided by Colonel VON ROSBERG of FALKENHORST's staff.

In the same year he established contact with the local Abwehr

Stelle through Colonel HOERST, also of FALKENHORST's staff. The chief of the Ast was Captain VON BONIUS, who was assisted and later succeeded by Major VON GALLEN. Through them ONODERA arranged to receive reports on Allied military activity in Great Britain -- troop movements, and air force and naval activities. The reports were transmitted to him through the office of VON UTTFALIN three or four times a month. They were received by ONODERA's assistant Col. ITO from one of the German Assistant Military Attachés, VON KOEHLINGSEGG of VON WATZDORF. Some of them originated in Berlin, but they were operational and much better than anything received by KOMATSU's office. They ceased after 20 July 1944.

B. ONUUCHII

As Japanese Military Attaché at Helsinki ONUUCHII had few German contacts. He was officially in touch with the German Military Attaché, Col. KITCHENAH, and the Naval Attaché, Capt. VON BONIUS (he says that the latter spoke good Russian and was the more interesting of the two), but they were more occupied with details of the alliance between Germany and Finland than with intelligence work. To ONUUCHII's astonishment, they were completely ignorant of what was going on when the Finns first put out feelers for a separate peace with the Soviets. In general, the Finns saw to it that no contact took place between their German and Japanese collaborators: for instance, POEHONEN took great pains to keep ONUUCHII away from the Finnish-German espionage training camps located near Rovaniemi.

ONUUCHII had some slight (and unproductive) dealings with CELLARIUS, whose work was known to him indirectly through KRISTIAN. On the whole, he had a low opinion of it.

4. Hungarian

(For further details see "Japanese Wartime Collaboration with the Hungarian Intelligence Service," SSU, 4 October 1946, DB #1241.)

A. ONODERA

To ONODERA's knowledge, there has never been any official collaboration between the Japanese and Hungarian General Staffs on a basis similar to that which has been described in the cases of Poland, Finland and Estonia. Limited cooperation did exist in Budapest between a group of Hungarian civilian and military code experts on the one hand, and on the other Col. HAYASHI, the Japanese Military Attaché, and Col. SAKURAI, who directed a small crypto-analysis section.

In Stockholm Japanese collaboration with the Hungarians was limited to official exchanges between ONODERA's office and that of the Hungarian Military Attaché, Col. KOBOR. KOBOR himself was accredited to both Sweden and Finland and during the war resided in Helsinki because he was able to obtain more valuable material there. Consequently, ONODERA rarely saw him, though ONUUCHII knew him well. He worked with the Germans and also with the Finnish General Staff through PAASONEN, whose wife was Hungarian. ONODERA says that his work was poor and that he was lazy and a drunkard.

From February 1942 to January 1944, ONODERA dealt with a resident member of KOBOR's staff, Col. VAGY. VAGY's experience in Department II of the Hungarian General Staff before his arrival in Stockholm had been confined to Rumanian affairs. ONODERA was able to help him with background information on the USSR, his primary target, and says that he was well qualified for his work; he became one of the most successful intelligence officers in Stockholm. They met once a week to exchange information and became close personal friends. (See below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained.)

In January 1944, VAGY was replaced by Col. VOECZKOENDY, who had previously been with the Russian Section of the Hungarian I.S., and with Abt II of the Abwehr in the southern sector of the eastern front. ONODERA describes him as much more interested in the internal political intrigues of the Hungarian diplomatic mission than in gathering intelligence. His sources, if he had any, were probably among journalists.

ONODERA saw him frequently but their contact was social and they never made any exchanges or studies together. He occasionally gave ONODERA miscellaneous information on political conditions in Great Britain and on the morale

SECRET CONTROL

of Allied soldiers in North Africa, and he described how he had formerly cooperated with FREYTAG VON LORINGHOVEN in training and organizing a group of Polish agents and parachutists who operated behind the Soviet lines in the Ukraine. He also sold OHODERA United States and British newspapers and magazines which he obtained allegedly from British pilots through the Countess CZERNIN. His relations with KOBOR, in contrast with those of VAGY, were excellent. He saw the Germans frequently and was in touch with KRANTZER. OHODERA says that although he was qualified to be a good source on the USSR, he was too closely bound to the Germans to be trusted.

He returned to Hungary in the autumn of 1944 because the Swedish government refused to recognize the recently installed Hungarian Nazi regime which he supported. (For further mention of him see SSU memorandum DB #1253, 30 September 1946, "Possible Diversion of Funds...to the Training of Hungarian and Finnish students...")

B. ONUUCHI

At Riga (1939-1940) ONUUCHI had worked for a short while with the Hungarian Military Attaché before the latter was transferred to Moscow. (When war broke out, this man returned to the Hungarian Army and in 1942 was taken prisoner by the Soviets.)

In Helsinki ONUUCHI knew Col. KOBOR, though at first contacts with him were difficult to make because KOBOR made frequent trips to Hungary. Active collaboration between them on intelligence matters began in September 1943; however, when KOBOR became ONUUCHI's best source for information about the western Allies. Because of his excellent connection with Col. PAASONEN, he obtained very complete material on this subject from the Finnish Attaché Section. (See below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained.)

ONOUCHI describes the above-mentioned Japanese-Hungarian collaboration in Budapest as "close" and says that in addition to assigning Hungarians to the crypto-analysis office headed by Col. SAKURAI, the Hungarian General Staff gave official permission for a Japanese military radio station to be set up in the office of the Japanese Military Attaché.

SECRET CONTROL

5. Swedish

(For further details see "Japanese Wartime Contacts with the Swedish Intelligence Service," SSU, 4 October 1946, DB #1245.)

ONODERA claims to have left many good friends in Sweden -- more than did any other member of the Japanese diplomatic mission. He says that this fact is due to his having always made a point of keeping business and social matters strictly separated, a courtesy much appreciated by the Swedes during the war. He had known some of them in Japan previously: for instance, the GADELIUS family, whose firm had traded between the two countries for several generations and whose children have Japanese names. The HARTIN MANSION family were a similar case. He had a long standing acquaintanceship with such Swedish diplomats formerly accredited to Japan as BAGGE, who had been Minister for many years and who knew ONODERA's family; and RIPA and SCHIDOW, who had both been Counsellors.

His best friend was Professor BOCK, the ichthyologist, who had studied in Japan for many years. He also knew General THORENELL, General EHRENSVARD, Admiral STROEMBOOI, Count DOUGLAS, and Count BONDE, and was active in the Japan-Sweden Club, whose president was Admiral DESCHAMPS and whose vice president the engineer FALBORGH. Although he of course discussed current events with these people, he claims never to have asked any of them for intelligence information, and he says that they were all correspondingly grateful to him. ONODERA's and his wife's popularity was evidenced by the fact that their Swedish friends gave a large tea party in their honor shortly before the repatriation; there was no such party for Minister OKAMOTO or for any other member of the mission.

Obtaining intelligence from official Swedish sources was very difficult and ONODERA says that the greater part of what he succeeded in getting came to him indirectly through other sources like HAASING or KRAMER. He describes the Swedish people as being most reserved in their offices and most likely to talk, if at all, when they are drinking at a party. He cites as an example the case of General NORDENSCHILD, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Air Force, who in 1943 at a farewell cocktail party in honor of Col. GARIBEA, the Rumanian Military Attaché, gave ONODERA a detailed account of American and British Air Force concentrations in England and forecast the date of the impending bomber offensive against Germany with considerable accuracy. ONODERA says that this information turned out to be very useful.

ONODERA was never able to get complete information about the Swedish I.S. He was in touch with each of three chiefs of the General Staff, Dept. II, who succeeded each other during the war: Col. ALDERKREUTZ, Commander LANDQUIST, and Col. JUHLIN-DANNFELD. He says that the intelligence command changed because the Swedes wanted to keep up with the progress of the war as it developed in favor of the Allies. ALDERKREUTZ had been known as a friend of Admiral CANARIS. LANDQUIST was not discreet about his contacts with the Germans; ONODERA once met him traveling on the plane to Berlin in the company of WAGNER. JUHLIN-DANNFELD he describes as having been pro-German while he was Military Attaché in Berlin at the beginning of the war, but as having later espoused the Allied cause with great vigor. ONODERA was also acquainted with Col. BOERNSTR JORNA and Col. KAEMP of the Military Intelligence Section, with Major PETERSEN of the Espionage Service, and with BONDE of Counter-espionage. He exchanged intelligence only with ALDERKREUTZ and PETERSEN (see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained).

6. Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe.

(See also "Japanese Wartime Military Missions in Europe," SSU, 4 October 1946, DB #1245.)

The various Japanese military missions in Europe communicated frequently. Their representatives gathered once a year at an official Attaché meeting which was presided over by the senior officer present. At these meetings each Attaché gave a brief account of his activities during the year past and of the war's development

as soon from the post. On the basis of those observations a joint report incorporating such recommendations as were deemed necessary was drawn up and forwarded to Tokyo. ONODERA had a poor opinion of the results achieved by the meetings, which occurred as follows:

1941	Berlin	Presiding Officer.	Gen. MAIZAI.
1942	"	"	"
1943	Rome	"	Gen. KOMATSU.
1944	Budapest	"	Gen. IWANOTO.

In addition it was customary for different posts to supply each other with information for use in exchanges with foreign sources. Either a report was prepared at the request of a specific post, or copies of reports to the General Staff were forwarded simultaneously with the original. ONODERA had agreements for such exchanges with the following:

- a. Berlin. After Tokyo, Berlin was ONODERA's most important source of exchange material. KOMATSU (the Military Attaché) was occupied more with diplomatic affairs than with intelligence, but ONODERA was in touch with the heads of different sections in his office from each of whom he received information on request.
  - i. From Col. KOTANI Etsuo who, he says, was the most active member of the Military Attaché's office, he received general information on the USSR. Its quality was always excellent, KOTANI being one of the foremost Japanese specialist in such matters.
  - ii. From Col. NISHI Hiashi he received troop movement reports obtained from the German General Staff and from German Air Force Headquarters, with which NISHI was liaison officer.
  - iii. From Col. ISHIZUKA he obtained information concerning Soviet war production and technical developments. ISHIZUKA was liaison officer with the Economic Section and the Armament Department of the German general Staff. He had spent two years in Russia and knew Soviet technical methods well.
  - iv. From Col. HIGUCHI Fukashi he received reports concerning the Abwehr (Abt II and III) and the Gestapo and Kripo. With Ass't Military Attaché YAMATO, HIGUCHI was in charge of liquidating the Japanese political sabotage plan against the USSR which had been handed over to the Germans in June 1941. Their work was kept highly secret. HIGUCHI had once served under ONODERA as an archivist in the Russian Section of the Japanese General Staff.
  - v. Col. SAMURAI Nobuta, liaison officer with the German crypto-analytical services, came once to Stockholm to take material which ONODERA had obtained from HALLAMA.

In exchange for the information he received from the above sources, ONODERA supplied military intelligence on the Russians and the western Allies as well as reports of German troop movements on both fronts. The latter were especially appreciated by the Japanese in Berlin because they were difficult to obtain in Germany.

- b. Helsinki. ONODERA's exchanges with OMOURI were made several times a month by courier. OMOURI supplied some Soviet material not obtained by ONODERA from his other sources. In return ONODERA gave general information about Soviet and Scandinavian matters.
- c. Madrid. At the Attaché meeting held in Rome (1943) ONODERA had agreed with Col. SAKURAI Keizo, the Military Attaché in Spain, for a regular series of exchanges between Stockholm and Madrid. SAKURAI sent reports on the armed forces of the western Allies in Europe and North Africa. He obtained them from official Spanish sources and from what ONODERA heard to be Hungarian and Italian agents. ONODERA sent back information derived from the Swedish General Staff and from BELLEGARDE.

1. Todor. At the beginning of 1941 he had a secret conversation with his agent in Tokyo, General TATEICHI, about the possibility of "ISIRIA's contribution in consideration of present situation both from British and American publications", which were very plentiful at that time in their neutral countries. SHODERA supplied him with a copy of the report sent to Madrid.

SHODERA denies that he received any military information on other than personal messages from the office of the Military Attaché in Switzerland. He was frequently in communication with the Swiss Legation but says that most of the correspondence in question concerned the health of one of his relatives who had fallen ill there and who subsequently died.

He had some conversations with General YEREMEYEV, the Military Attaché in Ankara, but never officially exchanged information with him. He says that although TATEICHI had reliable sources, the information which he cited as having been obtained from them was fragmentary, disconnected and far inferior to what SHODERA was getting from RUMYANTSEV.

Before the outbreak of the Russo-German war, exchanges of Soviet material with the Military Attaché in Moscow were frequent; after June 1941 these were forbidden by Tokyo. SHODERA had no direct contacts with Paris, Bucharest or Sophia. Those with the Budapest post were technical and concerned only with communications and crypto-analysis.

V. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED

For an account of the intelligence exchanged among the Japanese themselves see above, IV. 6., Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe.

The following summary is concerned largely with Positive Intelligence. Through their collaboration with the intelligence services or with various officials and nationals of certain countries who were also among their targets, the Japanese inevitably gained considerable knowledge of a Counter-Intelligence nature concerning those countries. The general structure of what they knew and told in the interrogation has been largely covered in the foregoing account by countries of their contacts and sources, however, and only supplementary instances are cited below.

It is reasonably certain that ONODERA and ONUOCHI received from Finnish, Swedish and perhaps Polish sources a good deal more intelligence on the western Allies than that admitted to in their interrogations and given here.

1. General Summary by Sources

Nationality of Source	Name of Source	Page Ref.	Subsource and/or Nationality	Nature of Intelligence Supplied	Target Country
--------------------------	-------------------	--------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------	-------------------

## a. Polish

(A. ONODERA)

RYBIKOWSKI	15	Extensive network of Poles incl. JA-KUBIC & KUNCEVICZ in Berlin, others at Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Warsaw, Kaunas, Koenigsberg, Riga, Helsinki, Narva	Various and detailed, incl. OB, troop movements, bases, strategy and tactics, economic intell.	USSR & Germany
------------	----	---	--	----------------

BRZESKI-WINSKI	16	GANO (Polish I.S. Chief) in London	Declaration of war; troop movements.	USA & Gr. Brit.
----------------	----	------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	-----------------

RYBIKOWSKI	in England	Allied military activity in India and Burma.	USA & Gr. Brit.
------------	------------	--	-----------------

(B. ONUOCHI)

ZABA	17	Politics and internal affairs.	Finland
------	----	--------------------------------	---------

BERSON	17	Previous contacts in Moscow	General information, described as superficial.	USSR
--------	----	-----------------------------	--	------

## b. Finnish

(A. ONODERA)

STEWEN	22	Finnish Gen. Staff.	Soviet military strength.	USSR
--------	----	---------------------	---------------------------	------

HALLAMAA, Finn.			Red Army Eastern Front OB.	USSR
-----------------	--	--	----------------------------	------

(Probably Swedish)			Internal political situation	Gr.Brit.
--------------------	--	--	------------------------------	----------

" PETERSEN (Swed.)	R.A.F.	tactical methods.	" "
--------------------	--------	-------------------	-----

(Allegedly a source located in Iceland)		Allied troops in Iceland.	Western Allies
---	--	---------------------------	----------------

Dept. II, Finnish General Staff		German Army Eastern Front OB.	Germany
---------------------------------	--	-------------------------------	---------

<u>Nationality of Source</u>	<u>Name of Source</u>	<u>Page Ref.</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Nature of Intelligence Supplied</u>	<u>Target Country</u>
b. Finnish WILLMAN (cont.)		22	Finnish refugee group in Stockholm; personal sources	Soviet fleet activities and troop movements in the Baltic area; codes.  German troop movements.  Resistance movement activities.  Military and diplomatic codes.	USSR  Germany  Finland  Gr. Brit., France, Vatican, Portugal, Turkey, Rumania, Yugoslavia.
HORMGREN		22	Source located in Soviet naval activity, one of Baltic States		USSR
KUMENIUS		23	HORN & SALZINGER, Publications (magazines). German		USA & Gr. Brit.
		"	"	"Latest info on German activities."	Germany
		"	"	CE vetting services.	(general)
PAASONEN, HALLAMAA, KALMUS, PALE &		23	Generally, the widespread contacts of the Finnish refugee group (incl. crypto section) of Stockholm	Soviet code material (both as codes and as subject matter).  Security services: protection of ONODERA's codes.  Reports on progress of war.	USSR  (general)  USSR
PALE		23	Finn. crypto sect.	Info that Swedish crypto sect. had broken ONODERA's general code.	Sweden
SALOKORPI		23	PALE archives of Finnish crypto section	Soviet codes.	USSR
				(B. ONUUCHI)	
POEHONEN (in his absence, SALOKORPI or RUNELA)		20	German forces in/Finnish Gen. Staff reports on Finland & Dept. II, development of war.  Finnish Gen. Staff		USSR
			"	Allied convoys in Murmansk & Archangel.	Allies
			Dept. II, Finn. Gen. Staff	Technical: planes, tanks, rocket guns.	USSR
			"	Military training methods.	"
			"	War production capacity.	"
			"	Interrogation of P.O.W.'s	"

SECRET CONTROL

Nationality of Source	Name of Source	Page Ref.	Subsource and/or Nationality	Nature of Intelligence Supplied	Target Country
b. Finnish (cont.)			CI Sect. of Dept., CI reports & annual "personality primer." II	Allies	
			Estimates Sect. Reports. II	"	
SALOKORPI	20	Espionage	" II	Use of propaganda & deception material in combat by Red Army.	USSR
PALE	20	Crypto	" "	Codes of all nations.	USA, Gr. Brit., USSR, Turkey, other
SLOBOR	20	Finnish Gen. Staff Attaché Section		Finnish Army & war capacity. Fragmentary German ditto.	Finland Germany
LAUTKARI	21	A Finnish news- paper		Internal conditions and political developments.	Finland
SHINIMAN	20	Not given		Internal conditions.	Finland

c. Estonian

(A. ONODERA)

MAASTING	24ff.	WAGNER (German); CE: vetting of all ONODERA's Soviet press new sources and agents. office, Stockholm; British passport control office, do.; Swedish police	(general)
		Estonian: Agents in Estonia, Latvia, Leningrad & Moscow	USSR
		Officers on Sov. General Staff: TOMBERG, RAIDNA, UDENS	"
JACOBSEN (Abwehr)		"Good information," including plans for invasion of USSR.	Germany, prob. USSR
GROSSMAN (in Sweden & Germany)		Unknown.	"
Finnish: NELANDER		Probably CE.	(general)
Indiv. unknown		Technical and scientific.	USSR
German:	"	" " "	"
CANARIS		Unknown.	Prob. USSR
CELLARIUS (Abwehr "Gruppe E")		"	Germany(?) USSR
SAIDRA (SS)		SS Divisions.	Germany
Abwehr		OB reports.	"

## SECRET CONTROL

Nationality of Source	Name of Source	Page	Subsources and/or Ref. Nationality	Nature of Intelligence Supplied	Target Country
c. Estonian (Cont.)	MAASING (Cont.)		<u>Swedish:</u> Army officers JUHLIN, DANNFIELD, KAEMPF, JUNG, PETERSEN, crypto section, state police (PALMGREN)	Unknown; probably various.	(general)
			PETERSEN (?)	Military activity	USA. Gr. Brit.
			Police	Advance notice of Swedish OB measures.	Sweden
			Indiv. unknown	Arnhem attack plans.	USA. Gr. Brit.
			<u>French:</u> GARNIER	Troop movements, OB	France; USA, Gr. Brit.
			"	Polit. & mil. developments	France
	<u>American:</u> CARLSON			Unknown, if any.	
	<u>British:</u> McKEBBING, CHESHIRE			" * "	
			<u>Subsources in general</u>	Troop movements, political, war potential.	USSR
			Unknown	Publications.	USA, Gr. Brit.
	MAASING (?)		Unknown	Atom bomb.	USA?
			"	V-weapons.	Germany
			"	Tank production.	USSR
BELLE- GARDE	26		Abwehr; Swedish & Russian agents; Swedish Army; Est- onian refugee group) CARLSON	Probably various. Allied attack and occupation plans.	esp. Germany
			..... (American consul) CHESHIRE (British Import Contr., Off.); resi- dence in England	Allied army for Far East. Troop movements and OB. Arrival of convoys in England.) Second front.	Western Allies
				Internal and political.	*
				Internal conditions.	USA, Gr. Brit.
JACOBSEN (via JUH- LIN-DANN- FELD)	26		Abwehr; CANARIS	Political	France
					Germany

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Nationality of Source</u>	<u>Name of Source</u>	<u>Page Ref.</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Nature of Intelligence Supplied</u>	<u>Target Country</u>
c. Estonian (cont.)	KRISTIAN	26	CELLARIUS (Germ.)	(Indirect results only, thru the Firms; none from KRISTIAN himself.)	USSR; Germany?
	SAARSEN	26	German (Abwehr); Police	Unknown.  (B. ONUUCHI)	prob. USSR, Germany
	PITTKA	27	POETHONEN (Firm); & PITTKA's contacts in Estonia	Political.	USSR/Estonia
d. Latvian				(A. ONODERA)	
	KIKKUS, PETERSON, ZERMINS	24	Latvian network in Ostrov, Pskov & neighboring frontier area	Probably various.	USSR
	BIRZINS	24	Unknown	Unknown  (B. ONUUCHI)	USSR
	KIKKUS, ZERMINS	27	Latvian Gen. Staff	Probably various.	USSR
e. German (to ONODERA only)	CANARTS (via WAGNER)	28	Abwehr	OKW reports; interrogation of Soviet P.O.W.'s; Soviet military publications. " Troop movements in India. " Military studies in chemical and biological warfare. " Conversational sitreps, discussion of needs of German & Jap. intelligence services.	USSR Western Allies Germany USSR, Western Allies, Germany
	KRAEMER	28	Abwehr	Technical reports on aircraft production; airborne & ground force troop movements. Ger. Air Force Fleet movements. Unknown U.S. attacks on Okinawa & Philippines, in advance. Unknown U.S. Air Force delegation to USSR. Swedish Metal production. Unknown Publications. Unknown Tanks and artillery.	USA, Gr. Brit. Gr. Brit. USA USA, USSR USSR USA, Gr. Brit. Gr. Brit.
	KRAEMER (?)		Unknown	Atom bomb.	USA?

SECRET CONTROL

Nationality of Source	Name of Source	Page Ref.	Subsource and/or Nationality	Nature of Intelligence Supplied	Target Country
e. German (cont.)	KRAEMER (?)	28	Unknown	Tank production.	USSR
	VON UTTIANN	29	VON BOHN & VON GALLEH (German)	Military activity in Gr. Brit.	Western Allies
			Swedish Military Circles	Monthly discussion with ONODERA of intelligence matters.	(general)
	VON HESI-NETZANN	29	Official German Air Force publ.	Air force information.	USA, Gr. Brit.
		*		War industries.	USSR
	VON ROSENBLATT	29	German	Latest German tech. develop.	Germany
	RISCHL (German Ass't Air Attaché, Stockholm)	Berlin		Names of sections of U.S. War Production Board.	USA
	KORNIGEBOG & VON WATZDORFF	30	German	General information on the progress of the war.	Allies

f. Hungarian

(A. ONODERA)

VAGY	30	Probably Swedish, Pacific offensive plans, in perhaps LANDQUIST advance.	USA
	Unknown	Misc. data on Allied forces in No. Africa & western front.	Western Allies
	Hungarian Gen. Staff	Military forces, tech. develop., war production.	USSR
	Indirectly from Swed. Gen. Staff	Germ. western front OB	Germany
	(Subsources in general included Swed. P.O., Gen. Staff & prob. Crypto Sect.; STEPH (Finns); GARNIER (French))		
VOECZ-KOENDY	30	Allegedly British Newspapers and magazines. pilots through Countess CZEZNIN, a Czech raised in Vienna.	USA, Gr. Brit.
	Unknown	Miscellaneous political.	Gr. Brit.
	Unknown	Morale of soldiers in No. Africa.	Western Allies

SECRET CONTROL

Nationality of Source	Name of Source	Page Ref.	Subsource and/or Nationality	Nature of Intelligence Supplied	Target Country
f. Hungarian (Contd.)					
			(B. ONOUCHI)		
	KOBOR	30 ff.	Finnish N.A. at Washington; PAA- SOHEN, Finnish Attaché Section	U. S. shipping and war produc- tion; 1942 industrial outlook.	USA
			PAASONEN & Finn- ish Attaché Sect.	No. Africa OB, late 1943.	USA, Gr. Brit.
		"		Misc. reports on Germ. Army.	Germany
		"		Soviet activ. in Balkans.	USSR
		"		Soviet Army & Air strength.	"
			Finn. Gen. Staff	Tech. reports on ordnance.	"
g. Swedish					
			(ONODERA only)		
PETER- SEV	32		Swed. Gen. Staff	Western front OB.	Western Allies
		"		Troop movement reviews.	All belligerents
		" (?)		Soviet troop movements on Finnish & Baltic fronts.	USSR
		" (?)		Germ. eastern front OB.	Germany
		" (?)		Technical studies: e.g., on rocket bombs.	Germany
			Swed. Secret Police	Samples of German sabotage apparatus.	Germany
			(Possible sub- sources of some of the above: attachés & diplomats of small countries)		
JUHLIN- DANEFIELD	32		JACOBSEN (Estonian)	See JACOBSEN.	
ALDER- KREUTZ	32		Swed. Gen. Staff, Dept. II	Troop movements; Baltic Fleet OB.	USSR
NORDEN- SCHILD	32		Swed. Air Force	Air force concentrations, bomber offensive (inadvertently given).	USA, Gr. Brit.
MANSON	32		MANSON Import- Export Co. (Swed.)	Discussion of trade and production trends.	(general)
		"		Legation bulletins.	USA, China

~~SECRET~~ CONTROL

Nationality of Source	Name of Source	Page Ref.	Subsource and/or Nationality	Nature of Intelligence Supplied	Target Country
g. Swedish (cont.)	MALM-STROEM, Director		Skandinaviska Bank (Swed.)	Swedish Quarterly Review and other economic publ. giving worldwide production figures.	(general)
		"		Assistance in drawing up economic reports.	(general)
	ESSEN, Manager		Dagsposten, Swed. pro-Nazi newspaper	Articles on internal conditions	USA, Gr. Brit.
	VICKLUND		Personal experience in Great Britain	Discussion of trip to Britain.	Gr. Brit.
	TYINNE		Swedish firm of GADELJUS	Price quotations and market conditions.	Swed. & general
	Frau LARSBERGER (employee in ONODERA's office)		Swedish press	Translations.	"

2. Detailed Summary by Target Countries

Items affecting the United States and Great Britain jointly, as well as a few concerning other of the Allies than those two or the USSR, will be found listed under b., Western Allies.

Target Country	Description of Intelligence Obtained	Date Obt. (When Known)	Source and/or Nationality	Subsource and/or Nationality
a. USA	Reports dealing with the atom bomb. (?)	After Oct. 1944	KRAEMER (Germ.) or HAASING (Estonian)	Unknown
USA	Plan for the general U.S. offensive in the Pacific (subsequent developments proved this information to have been accurate).	Time of attack on Bougainville	VAGY (Hung.)	probably Swed., perhaps LANDQUIST (page 32)
	Plan for the U.S. attack on the Aleutians, and other information about U.S. forces in Alaska.	1 month in advance.	"	"
	Report of the forthcoming U.S. attacks on the Philippines and Okinawa. Described as not detailed enough.	"Sufficiently in advance to be interesting"	KRAEMER (German)	Unknown
	Reports of U.S. Air Force delegation visit to Soviet airfields in Siberia. (ONODERA says he never received further confirmation.)	Between Aug. 1944 & May 1945	"	"
	Reports on U.S. plane production, in great detail and containing production figures on various plane types.	Monthly during 1945	Unknown	Written in German

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
USA	Report, seemingly derived in part from publications, on naval and merchant marine shipping in the U.S.	Early 1944	KOBOR (Hung.)	GRENDAR (spelling?), Finnish N.A. Washington
	General report of war production in U.S.	"	"	"
	Industrial outlook in U.S. in 1942.	1942	"	PAASONEN & Finn. Attaché Section
	Names of the different sections of the War Production Board.		RIEDEL (Germ. Ass't A.A.)	Berlin
	U.S. diplomatic code (see concluding section 3., below).	1943 (broken 1941)	PALE (Firm)	Finnish Crypto Section
	U.S. magazines (publications).	late 1944-July 1945	KUMENIUS (Finn)	Unknown
b. Western Allies				
	A report of plans for the Allied attack on Arnhem (sic). This doubtless refers to Arnhem, where paratroops of the First Allied Airborne Army landed 15 Sept. 1944. No comment as to how far in advance or how accurate.		HAASING (Est.)	Swedish
	Report of a second Allied attack on the southern side of Cherbourg Peninsula, scheduled for Aug. 1944. (This report was considered important by the Germans, who had been expecting the second attack from the north in the vicinity of Honfleur and Le Havre.)	After D-Day (5 June 1944)	BELLEGARDE (Estonian)	Unknown
	Allied plan for attack in the direction of Osnabrück in March 1945. (The Germans had expected such an attack in July.)	Dec. 1944	BELLEGARDE (Estonian in England)	Unknown
	Detailed account of U.S. and British air force concentrations in England, with a considerably accurate forecast of the impending bomber offensive against Germany. (ONODERA says this information turned out to be very useful.)	1945	HORDENSCHILD (C-in-C of Swedish Air Force)	(Swedish Air Force sources)
	Very detailed reports on aircraft production in U.S. & Great Britain. Sometimes contained important items about new methods or changes in the location of factories.	Monthly, Aug. 1944-May 1945	KRAEMER (German)	Probably official German Air Force publications
	Western front OB: detailed studies by the Swedish Gen. Staff. (ONODERA mentions one he gave to KRAEMER as having been dated 22 Feb. 1945.)	2 or 3 occasions between mid-1943 & April 1945	PETERSEN (Swedish)	Swedish General Staff

~~SECRET~~ CONTROL

<u>Target Country Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
b. Western Allies (cont.)			
Reports on Allied convoys in Murmansk and Archangelak.		POETHONEN (Finn)	Finnish General Staff; partly from German forces stationed in Finland.
Excellent reports on movement of Allied air bases in Europe with details of OB, plane types, etc.	Regularly during 1944	Unknown	Unknown
Reports on the passage of Allied planes through (sic) Gibraltar.	"	"	German
Reports on changes of command in the military forces of the western Allies.	Regularly in 1944 & early 1945	"	Unknown
Detailed report on organisation in England of an army for the Far East.	Early 1945	BELLEGARDE (Estonian in England)	"
Details of mobilisation and troop movements in India.	Before Mar. 1944	CANAVIS (German) via WAGNER	Abwehr
Allied military activity in Great Britain: troop movements, air force and naval activities. Some of these originated in Berlin but were operational and much better than anything received by the Jap. I.A. office there.	3 or 4 times monthly from 1945-20 July 1944	VON UTH-MAINZ (German)	VON BONIN & VON GALLEN (German)
Arrival of convoys in Britain.	Mid-1944	BELLEGARDE (Estonian)	Unknown
Answers to questions about the Second Front.	"	"	"
Fragmentary reports on Allied troops in Iceland.		STEVEN (Finn)	According to STEVEN, a source in Iceland
Technical material on new U.S. and British plane types.	Aug. 1944-May 1945	KRAETZER (Germ.)	Probably official Germ. Air Force publications
OB of U.S. and British Air Forces in Europe and India. Those of Europe were detailed, containing group numbers, plane types, armament and base location.	"	"	"
Description and movements of U.S. and British airborne divisions.	"	"	(OKODERA thinks, judging from the style, that this may have come from a British military source)
General U.S. and British troop movements on all fronts.	"	"	Official German A.F. reports
		(The same type of info was also furnished by MAASING, PETERSEN, BELLEGARDE)	

SECRET CONTROL

Target Country	Description of Intelligence Obtained	Date Obt. (When Known)	Source and/or Nationality	Subsource and/or Nationality
<b>b. Western Allies (cont.)</b>				
	Swedish Gen. Staff reviews of troop movements of all belligerents on all fronts.	Mid-1943- April 1945	PETERSEN (Swedish)	Swedish General Staff
	Misc. data on Allied forces on the western front and in No. Africa.	Feb. 1942- Aug. 1943	VAGY (Hung.)	Unknown
	Morale of Allied soldiers in No. Africa.	1944	VOECZKOENDY (Hung.)	"
	OB of U.S. and British forces in North Africa.	Late 1943	KOBOR (Hung.)	PAASONEN & Finn. Attaché Section
	General info on progress of war.	Weekly from Oct. 1944	KOENIGSEGG & VON WATZDORFF (German)	(Office of Germ. M.A., Stockholm)
	Reports describing Allied plane characteristics.	1945	Unknown	(In English, evidently not written by a technician)
	U.S. and British Air Force info.	Mid-1942- Oct. 1944	VON HEINE- MANN (Germ.)	Official German A.F. publ.
	Finnish Dept. IX CI Section reports		POETINEN (Finn)	As indicated
	Finnish Dept. II Estimates Section reports.		" and SALONKUPI	"
	U.S. and British newspapers and magazines.	1944	VOECZKOENDY (Hung.)	Countess CZERNIK, allegedly from Brit. pilots
	Ditto: <u>The Economist</u> , <u>The Financial News</u> , <u>The Financial Times</u> , <u>The New York Times</u> , <u>Life</u> , <u>Time</u> , <u>Fortune</u> , etc.		KUNTEUS (Finn), MAASTIK (Est.), KRAUTER (Germ.), Hung. M.A., et al.	Unknown
	Translations from the Swedish press.		Frau LARSDER- GER (Swedish) of OJODERA's office	Swedish news- papers
	Articles for Domci on internal conditions in U.S. and Great Britain.		ESSEN, pro- Nazi Swede	(Presumably sources of the Swed. news- paper <u>Dag- posten</u> )
	Political and military developments in France.		GARDIER (French)	Gaullist Gen. Staff, prob. other French sources

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
<b>b. Western Allies (cont.)</b>				
	Internal political conditions in France.	Apr. 1945	BELLEGARDE (Estonian, in England)	(Personal observation in March 1946)
	Chinese Legation (Stockholm) bulletin.		HANSON (Swed.)	
<b>c. Great Britain</b>				
	2 reports containing extensive material on R.A.F. tactical methods, described as most valuable. (CHODERA was complimented by Tokyo HQ for getting them.)		STENEN (Finn)	Prob. Swedish, perhaps PETERSEN
	Reports on British tanks and artillery.	Feb. 1945	Probably KRAZNER (Czech.)	(Written in German)
	Plans for British Army of Occupation in Germany.	Mid-1945	BELLEGARDE (Estonian, in England)	Unknown
	British Govt. code of 1934, complete.	Mar. 1945	WILLIAMS (Finn)	Finn. refugee crypto group
	A report on the political situation within Great Britain.		STENEN (Finn)	Probably Swedish
	Misc. info on ditto.	1944	VUCZKUSNDY (Hung.)	Unknown
	Discussion (with CHODERA's assistant INOUE) of a trip to Britain.		VICKLUND (Swed.)	Personal observation
<b>d. USSR</b>				
<u>Significant material</u>				
	Soviet mobilization plan.	Spring 1941	MAASING (Est.)	Unknown
	Plans and descriptive details of the "Stalin Line."	" " "	"	"
	Reports on Soviet Gen. Staff conversations of Oct. 1941; discussion between STALIN, who wanted to defend Moscow at all costs, and TROTSKY, who advocated retreating beyond the Volga.	Late 1941 or early 1942	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	"
	Movement of Soviet reserves called back from the Volga line to defend Moscow (winter 1941-1942).	"	"	"
	Soviet plans (Spring 1942) for strategic retreat to Don-Stalingrad-Volga-Kuban line.	1942	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	"
	Reports concerning removal of Soviet war industry to the Ural region.	"	"	"
	The Soviet operational plan for the central front.	"	"	"

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target</u> <u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt.</u> <u>(When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or</u> <u>Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or</u> <u>Nationality</u>
d. USSR (cont.)				
	Soviet Gen. Staff estimates of German operations in 1942 (STALIN feared a German attack against the left wing of the Moscow front).	1942	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	Unknown
	Impending Soviet declaration of war against Japan.	After German surren- der	BRZESKIWIENSKI (Polish)	GANO (London Polish I.S. Chief)
	Movement of 10 Soviet divisions to the Far Eastern front.	"	"	"
	Situation reports of the eastern front and of Soviet troop movements. These were most complete, containing detailed identification of units and positions, but OMODERA complains that they always came too late to be of use.	Weekly for 10 months prior to Japanese surrender	WILLMAN (Finn)	Finnish refugee group
	Regular reports on Soviet troop movements in Finland, Latvia, Estonia, White Russia, Leningrad and (to a lesser extent) Moscow. They were very detailed, giving unit identifications and pinpoint positions.	3 or 4 times a month (exact period unknown)	MAASING (Est.)	Unknown
	Finnish Gen. Staff reports on development of the war against USSR: troop movements, air and ground force OB; ordnance, supplies and replacements; naval activities in the Baltic.	every 10 days (exact period unknown)	POEMIOHENI (Finn)	Finnish Gen. Staff; German forces in Finland
	Soviet Baltic Fleet OB: a complete report which OMODERA passed on to the Japanese M.A. at Moscow.	April 1941	ALDIERKREUTZ (Swedish)	Swed. Dept. II
	Reports on Soviet fleet and troop movements in the Baltic area.	Prior to Mar. 1945	WILLMAN (Finn)	Finn. Gen. Staff; personal sources in Sweden
	Complete OB of Soviet eastern front armies (1 report).		STEVEN (Finn)	HALLANIAA of Finn. crypto group
	Reports on Soviet military forces, technical developments and war production.	Monthly, Feb. 1942-Oct. 1943	VAGY (Hung.)	Hungarian Gen. Staff
	Technical reports on new developments in construction of Soviet planes, tanks and rocket guns.		POEMIOHENI (Finn)	Finnish Gen. Staff
	Estimates of Soviet strategic reserves.	Frequently after 1942	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	Unknown
	Detailed description of new Soviet aircraft carrier.	1945	WILLMAN (Finn.)	Finn. Gen. Staff or personal sources in Sweden

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
d. USSR (cont.)				
Extensive Soviet code material (see below).	Throughout the war	Various Finns	Finnish Crypto Section	
<u>Misc. Reports on Troop Movements, OB etc.</u>				
Soviet troop movements in Latvia, Lithuania and East Poland.	Feb.-June 1941	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	Unknown	
Ditto, northeastern & central fronts.	After 1942	"	"	
Reviews of Soviet military strength.	Monthly (exact period unknown)	STEVEN (Finn)	Finnish Gen. Staff	
Soviet naval activity.		HORNIGRELL (Finn)	Subsource in one of Baltic states	
Operational reports on eastern front.		Unknown	German S.S.	
Soviet troop movements on the Finnish front.		HALLAMAA (Finn)	Unknown	
Ditto, northern sector of eastern front.	Aug. 1941	ALDERERREUTZ (Swedish)	Swed. Dept. II	
Movement of Soviet armies and divisions on Finnish and Baltic fronts.	Between mid-1943 & Apr. 1945	PETERSEN (Swedish)	Swed. Gen. Staff?	
Reports on strength of Soviet army and air force.		KOBOR (Hung.)	Finn. Gen. Staff; PAASONEN & Attaché Section	
General info on progress of the war.	Weekly from Oct. 1944	KOETTIGSEGG & VON WATZDORF (German)	(Office of Germ. M.A., Stockholm)	
<u>Soviet military training methods.</u>		POEHYHONEN (Finn.)	Finn. Gen. Staff	
<u>Misc. Reports on Technical Subjects, Production Capacity, War Potential etc.</u>				
Figures of railroad transportation of Soviet war materials and troops in eastern Poland.	Feb.-June 1941	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	Unknown	
Soviet scientific and technical develop.		MAASING (Est.)	German and Finnish	
Soviet war industry production figures.		"	Unknown	
Figures and estimates of Soviet war production capacity.		POEHYHONEN (Finn.)	Finnish Gen. Staff	
Reports on Soviet ordnance develop.		KOBOR (Hung.)	Finn. technicians	

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
d. USSR (cont.)				
	Soviet tank production.	Mar. 1945	KRAEMER (Germ.) or MAASING (Est.)	Unknown
	Soviet war industries.	Mid-1942-Oct. 1944	VON HEINEMANN (German)	Official German air force publications
	<u>Codes, CE Material, P.O.W. Interrogations</u>			
	Four Soviet military codes: (1) Five-symbol operational code complete with method for use; (2) Five-symbol NKVD code complete with method; (3) Four-symbol tank combat communication code, incomplete—about 20-25% broken; (4) Four-symbol air force communications code, ditto.	Nov. 1944	WILLMAN (Finn)	Finnish refugee crypto group
	One four-symbol Soviet military code, incomplete — about 25% broken.	Jan. or Feb. 1945	"	"
	Four Soviet codes: (1) NKVD five-digit, complete analysis (same as above?); (2) NKVD five-digit, incomplete analysis; (3) and (4) military combat communication codes, possibly for tank units (same as last two above?)		Probably SALOKORPI (Finn)	PALE archives of Finnish refugee crypto group
	(See also concluding section 3., below.)			
	Soviet army use of deception material and propaganda in combat.	Dec. 1940	SALOKORPI (Finn)	Finnish Dept. II Espionage Section
	Finnish Dept. II CI Section reports and yearly 'personality primer.'		POETONIEN (Finn)	Finnish Dept. II CI Section
	Reports on interrogation of Soviet P.O.W.'s.		"	Finn. Gen. Staff
	Ditto dealing with eastern Siberia.	Before Mar. 1944	CANARIS (Germ.) via WAGNER	Abwehr
	<u>Publications, Political, Miscellaneous</u>			
	Soviet military publications recently captured on the eastern front.	Before Mar. 1944	CANARIS (Germ.) via WAGNER	Abwehr
	Translations from the Swedish press.		Frau LARSEN-GER (Swed.) of OMODERA's off.	Swedish newspapers
	Soviet political developments in Finland, Latvia, Estonia, White Russia, Leningrad and Moscow.		MAASING (Est.)	Unknown

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
d. USSR (cont.)				
	Political conditions in Estonia under Soviet occupation.	Regularly from Oct. 1940	PITTKA (Est.)	POETHONEN (Finn) in late 1940; PITTKA's contacts in Estonia
	Report on Soviet activity in Balkans.		KOBOR (Hung.)	PAASONEN (Finn) & Attaché Section
	(General?) reports on the USSR for which OMODERA paid 600 Yen apiece.		KRISTIAN (Est.)	CELLARIUS (Germ.) SALOKORPI (Finn)
	Finnish Dept. II Estimates Section reports.		POETHONEN or SALOKORPI (Finn)	Finnish Dept. II Estimates Section
	General info on the USSR -- superficial.	Fall 1940	BERSON (Polish)	Previous contacts in Moscow
e. Finland				
	Internal conditions and political developments, especially with regard to:		LAUTKARI, Finnish newspaperman (via Jap. Minister at Helsinki)	Unknown
	a. Impending peace negotiations;	Feb. 1944		
	b. Peace terms.	Aug. 1944		
	Reports on Finnish army and war capacity.		SLOBOR (Finn)	Finn. Gen. Staff Attaché Section
	Military and political developments in Finland.		SALOKORPI (Finn)	PALE archives, Finn. refugee crypto group
	Info concerning activities of the Finnish resistance movement.	10 months prior to Japanese surrender	WILLUAN (Finn)	Finnish refugee group
	Internal conditions -- regular reports.		SHIRKAN (Finn)	Unknown
	Politics and internal affairs.	Oct. 1940-June 1941	ZABA (Polish; one of RYBIKOWSKI's network)	"
f. Germany				
	Plan for invasion of the USSR in June 1941.		MAASING (Est.)	JACOBSEN (Est. in Abwehr)
	Establishment of German air bases in Poland.	Between Feb. & June 1941	RYBIKOWSKI	Unknown
	Concentration of German forces in East Prussia and near Warsaw.	"	"	"
	(Through the above two items, OMODERA was able to confirm other information which revealed the German plan to attack the USSR.)			

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
<b>f. Germany</b>				
	General strategic plans of the German High Command for the spring of 1943.		MAASING (Est.)	SAIDRA (German S.S.)
	Very detailed reports on western front OB.	1943	VAGY (Hung.)	Obtained indirectly from Swed. Gen. Staff; prepared by JUHLIN-DAHFELD
	Soviet Gen. Staff estimates of German operations in 1942.	Between July 1941 & Dec. 1942	RYBIKOWSKI	Unknown
	OB in great detail, including unit identification and positions.	"Best in 1941-1942"	MAASING (Est.)	Abwehr
	Misc. material on the German army, incl. a report on the limits of the German retreat on the eastern front and an estimate of German capacity to hold the Baltic states.		KOROR (Hung.)	PAASONEN & Firm. Attaché Section
	Reports on German technical developments: e.g., V-1 and V-2 rocket bombs. These were complete studies with photographs.	Between Oct. 1944 & Apr. 1945	PETERSEN (Swed.)	Swedish General Staff?
	German military studies of chemical and biological warfare methods. These were in great detail and were considered interesting by Tokyo.	Before Mar. 1944	CANARIS (German) via WAGNER	Abwehr
	German Army OB.	After 1942	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	Unknown
	Formation and composition of new S.S. divisions.		MAASING (Est.)	SAIDRA (German S.S.)
	OB reports of German units on eastern front, received regularly.		STEWEN (Fin.)	Swed. Gen. Staff Dept. II
	Ditto (armies and divisions).	Mid-1943-Apr. 1945	PETERSEN (Swed.)	Swedish General Staff?
	Frequent reports with estimates of German war industry production.	After 1942	RYBIKOWSKI (Polish)	Unknown
	Technical developments in Germany.		Unknown	German
	Latest German technical developments.		VON ROSEN-BLATT (Germ.)	Official German sources?
	Samples of German sabotage apparatus.	Between mid-1943 and April 1945	PETERSEN (Swed.)	Swedish Secret Police
	Military and commercial transportation on the Danube.	1944	Unknown	Unknown
	Periodic reports (general in scope?)	Aug. 1942-Sept. 1944	BELLEGARDE (Est.)	Abwehr
	General Staff reviews of troop movements of all belligerents on all fronts.	Between mid-1943 & Apr. 1945	PETERSEN (Swed.)	Swedish General Staff

SECRET CONTROL

<u>Target Country</u>	<u>Description of Intelligence Obtained</u>	<u>Date Obt. (When Known)</u>	<u>Source and/or Nationality</u>	<u>Subsource and/or Nationality</u>
f. Germany (cont.)				
	Reports on the political situation in Germany.	Occasional until Mar. 1944	JACOBSEN (Est.)	CANARIS & Abwehr
	Answers to ONODERA's questions about internal conditions in Germany.	Summer 1944	BELLEGARDE (Est.)	Unknown
	"Fragmentary German material."		SLOWOR (Finn.)	Finn. Gen. Staff Attaché Section
g. Sweden				
	Advance notice of pending Swedish CE measures.		MAASING (Est.)	Swedish Police and other
	Info that Swedish crypto service had broken ONODERA's general code.	Early 1945	PALE of Finn. crypto group	Unknown

3. Foreign Code Material Obtained by the Japanese through Collaboration with the Finnish Crypto-Analysis Group

(For background see page 21, above.)

In his work with the Finns, HIROSE was associated with that branch of the Crypto-Analysis Section which concentrated on Soviet codes. He was aware, however, of the work of other branches and knows that they were successful in breaking codes of the United States, Great Britain, Turkey and other nations. On instructions from Tokyo he had frequently requested results obtained from the study of U.S. material; they were refused until the autumn of 1943, when he was given a diplomatic strip-type cipher which he describes as consisting of 15 horizontal lines of 30 letters each and designated, he believes, as "A-1." He says that the Finns were able to break this American code because of enciphering mistakes made at the Embassy in Vichy during 1941. The same code was later found to be in use by the American missions at Bern and Chungking, the last messages which HIROSE saw having been dated December 1942. He adds that the Finns were sometimes helped in their attempts to break new American ciphers by the fact that a new system would be used for communications between European stations while the old system was still being employed to send the same message between London and Washington.

ONODERA denies that he ever had a U.S. code; he says that he repeatedly requested such material from the Finns but received the answer that the Japanese already had the best available in Tokyo. As indicated above, he did receive one complete British code and considerable Soviet material; and in March 1945 he obtained from the Finnish refugee crypto-analysis group (through the Finnish Naval Attaché, Capt. WILLMAN) the following:

- a. One Turkish military attaché code, complete with method, whose name ONODERA remembers as "Gankai," and three or four incomplete Turkish codes (names unremembered). He was officially complimented by Tokyo HQ for obtaining the complete one.
- b. Two French (Vichy) diplomatic codes, incomplete.
- c. Two Rumanian diplomatic (?) codes, incomplete.
- d. One Vatican code, incomplete.
- e. One Yugoslav code, incomplete.
- f. One Portuguese code, incomplete.

The Finnish Crypto-Analysis Section's Russian branch (with which HIROSE collaborated) was successful in breaking Soviet infantry, tank and air force combat communications ciphers. It failed to break the Navy "Red" five-digit code because call signs and keys were changed daily from the very beginning of the war -- a system later adopted by the Red Army.

SECRET CONTROL

The NKVD four-digit codes presented no difficulties. They varied according to the regional divisions of the USSR with special types for Moscow, Leningrad, eastern Siberia and the NKVD frontier guard posts. Individual codes differed through changes in the additive tables. The best results obtained with these came from material intercepted by the Japanese between Kamchatka and Vladivostok.

HIROSE describes the development of Finnish crypto-analytic during the war as follows: at the beginning of the invasion of Russia by the Germans in June 1941, various weak points in the Soviet Army codes were exposed by the German surprise attack. The Finns easily deciphered these codes and when they entered the war in July they had already accumulated considerable information on the disposition and strength of the Soviet armed forces which faced them. The vital five-digit code used by the Soviets in the summer of 1941 was easily deciphered because of its systematic arrangement of digits and the use of a set additive table.

At the end of 1941 the front was temporarily stabilized and the Soviets tried to correct the weaknesses in their cryptographic system. During the intervening period prior to the distribution of a new cipher, they tried to strengthen the existing system by using a double additive on each message. They began at that time a routine of revising their codes at intervals of from two to six months. They also controlled the use of additive tables, dividing them into three categories -- one-time pads, rotating and general -- thus making it difficult to decipher messages unless a large number were accumulated. They used a two- to four-digit code of increasing complexity, often changing both the key and the cipher.

In 1942, in spite of these difficulties, the Finnish crypto-analysts managed to keep up with the changes in the Soviet codes. The major portion of the messages which they deciphered were related to the German sector of the front rather than to their own, since operations on the latter had almost ceased whereas the former continued to be very active. The following conditions are described by HIROSE as being responsible for the Finnish successes:

- a. Interception of material from the German front.
- b. Simultaneous use by the Soviets of old and new ciphers during a period when ciphers were being changed.
- c. Mistakes of enciphering (fixed habits and non-adherence to regulations).
- d. Special characteristics of long messages.
- e. Special characteristics of short messages.

During the spring of 1943 the volume of Soviet traffic greatly decreased, and there was an over-all intensification of precautionary measures as a result of which it became impossible to decipher operational messages. The only success encountered was with four-digit codes. In 1944 difficulties increased. The Soviets employed even stricter security measures, instituted a large number of communication regulations and greatly restricted the use of N/T so that the Finns found it no longer possible to break Soviet ciphers by intercepting operational traffic.

APPENDIX A: LIST OF PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE AT STOCKHOLM

ITO, Col. Kiyokazu, Ass't Military Attaché)  
KIGUCHI, Maj. Yasukazu, " " " )  
SATO, Maj. Tatsuya, " " " ) See Reference (c)  
INOUE, Yoichi, civilian )  
SATO, Kichinosuke, " )

HIGUCHI, Lt. Col. Fukashi, Ass't Military Attaché

Though carried on the diplomatic list as accredited to Sweden and Finland. HIGUCHI was resident in Berlin where he worked under Gen. YAMAMOTO (Ass't M.A.) on special liaison with the Abwehr (Abt II and III) and the S.S. ONODERA says that he was officially assigned to positions in Stockholm and Helsinki because he would thus obtain diplomatic facilities for his movements. He also worked with a liaison group concerned with CHANDRA BOSE. (See above, IV. 6, Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe.)

HOMMA, Jiro

Mitsui representative, shipping expert. He had formerly been stationed in London and had travelled to the United States, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. In Stockholm he worked on shipping publications and coding. He acted as intermediary between ONODERA and Frau MAEKINEN, an employee, of the Finnish Legation, and meetings with the Finns PAASONEN, HALANAA and PALE were held in his flat. He was also in touch with ERICSSON and FINKE in connection with the proposed ball bearing purchases.

URA, Saburo

A painter who had lived in Europe for many years and had been recruited for service in the office of the Military Attaché at Helsinki at the beginning of the war. He came to Stockholm after the Finnish surrender in the fall of 1944. He was used most frequently as a courier and general messenger. The Finns all knew him and he therefore sometimes acted as intermediary with them, particularly with SALOKORPI of the F.I.S. Espionage Section. ONODERA says that he was too fond of women and drink to be trusted with serious intelligence work.

YOGOI, Shinichi

Japanese businessman married to an Estonian and formerly resident in Helsinki. He had lost all his possessions through the war and come to Stockholm as a refugee. ONODERA found him already employed in the office when he arrived. YOGOI helped with all the office work but it was never possible to trust him because he suffered from a nervous disorder. In May 1942 he left for Berlin to work in the Manchurian Legation.

SASAKI

A clerk from the Japanese War Ministry who was originally assigned to the office of the Military Attaché in Stockholm. However, he never worked for ONODERA because he had already been transferred to Helsinki by NISHIMURA late in 1910. He subsequently went to Berlin where he worked with HIGUCHI. (See also APPENDIX B.)

KJESSLER, Karin (Mrs.)

Stenographer who was a member of ONODERA's staff throughout his stay in Stockholm. She was in charge of all matters requiring the use of the Swedish language such as protocol, social invitations, etc. ONODERA says that she never participated in any intelligence activities.

LARSSON, Mrs.

Employed during 1943 to translate Swedish publications into English for assistants who were preparing economic and technical studies.

RYBINOWSKI & RYDICKI, MICHAŁOWSKI, Piotro IWANOW

Ex-chief of the German Section of the Polish I.S. who possessed both a Russian and a Manchurian passport. He was carried on the office roster as a secretary until expelled from Sweden because of German pressure in the spring of 1944.  
(For further details see above, IV. 1., Polish Contacts and Sources.)

The following individuals have all been reported at various times as having been connected with ONODERA's office, but he denies ever having employed or had more than casual contact with any of them:

GUJKIN, Boris (probably the same as KUKSIN)  
HAUSEGARD, Hils  
JERNSTRÖM, Karl Evert  
LEHNUAR  
LIMMERGER, Eric  
SELAUDER, Maud  
STALGÅF E, Sixten

APPENDIX B: LIST OF PERSONNEL OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE AT HELSINKI

HIROSE, Lt. Col. Eiichi, Ass't Military Attaché

[At the beginning of his tour of duty in Helsinki HIROSE spent nearly all his time in collaboration with the Finnish crypto-analysis group. Later on this was broken off and he took over the work of administrative officer and paymaster for ONUCHI.]  
(For a description of his work see above, IV 2. e, Finnish Contacts and Sources; for a biographical sketch of subject, Reference (b).)

HIGUCHI, Lt. Col. Fukashi, Ass't Military Attaché

HIGUCHI was never resident in Finland. He came to Helsinki in December 1940 to obtain information on the use of propaganda and deception material in combat by the Russian Army, collaborating in this work with SALOKORPI of the F.I.S. Espionage Section, and again in 1941 and at the end of 1943.

KIKKAWA Akira.

Civilian assistant in charge of office administration and coding. He was transferred to Bulgaria when a Military Attaché's office was opened there in July 1944. He was chronically ill and unable to contribute much to office activities.

SAZAKI.

Clerk, worked on administrative matters and drafted final reports for Tokyo. He always remained on duty at the office when ONUCHI was away travelling. He had formerly been assigned to Col. NISHINURA in Stockholm, but when the latter returned to Japan he was transferred to Finland. He had previously been there on temporary duty to substitute for KIKKAWA.

HAKATA Chozemon.

Clerk, assisted HIROSE in matters connected with crypto-analysis and prepared the reports on that subject for Tokyo. He also worked as a code clerk. He had previously been in the crypto-analysis office in Budapest and was suddenly transferred to Helsinki without being requested by ONUCHI. He knew the Russian language but could not speak it well.

SECRET CONTROL

URA Saburo.

Secretary. A former painter whom ONODERA describes as unfit for work in a military attaché's office. He had formerly been in Stockholm with NISHIMURA.

The following officers came to Helsinki on special missions: HOJO, Lt. Col. in the Medical Corps. He was sent from Tokyo in March 1941 to investigate the use of bacteriological warfare by the Russians during the winter campaign of 1939-1940. His arrival was delayed because the Russians at first refused to give him a transit visa. His findings revealed some evidence of the use of carbon poison bacillus (?) on a small scale. He went to Berlin and remained there for the rest of the war.

KOTANI, Col. Etsuo.

Came to Finland in February 1944 as head of a mission of Japanese Army, Navy and Air personnel to inspect German air force winter installations.

OCHIAI, 1st Lt.

Engineer. Came from Berlin in July 1941 to study conditions on the Eastern Front. He returned to Berlin.

APPENDIX C: JAPANESE JOURNALISTS IN STOCKHOLM

1. Domei

SAITO Masumi, SAZAKI Rinichi.

Domei was the only service which was actually connected with ONODERA's office. As stated above, he used it for communicating non-confidential matters to Tokyo. These consisted of business, technical and military analyses prepared by his assistants; material from illegally obtained publications was sometimes included. INOUE was closely associated with the Domei men in this arrangement.

SAITO had previously worked in China, Berlin and Lisbon. He frequently came to the Military Attaché's office to discuss the war or arrange for the sending of dispatches, but was never in any sense a member of the staff. ONODERA says that he received more information than he gave.

SAZAKI arrived from Italy at the beginning of 1944. He was SAITO's assistant and played a subordinate role.

2. Yamuri

URESHINO, KITAMURA Hiroshi, MAKI Shin.

URESHINO represented this service when ONODERA arrived in Stockholm. He was hard working and intelligent and occasionally produced interesting items which he passed on to the Minister or the Counsellor.

KITAMURA, in spite of his reputation as a savant, ONODERA considers totally unsuited to intelligence work. He describes him as an intellectual cretin. Shortly after his arrival he offered his services to ONODERA and wanted to work as an agent in the gathering of military intelligence, but ONODERA refused. In the spring of 1945 KITAMURA received no funds from Japan and was reduced to such a precarious state that ONODERA was obliged to lend him small sums for living expenses.

MAKI Shin was assistant to KITAMURA. He also borrowed money from ONODERA in 1945.

3. Asahi

WATANABE Shinichiro, ERIMA.

WATANABE had only social contacts with ONODERA. He got into trouble with the Legation for sending as information from his own sources material taken from a copy of Time magazine which he had succeeded in getting sooner than his colleagues. He was succeeded by ERIMA, whom ONODERA hardly knew.

A. Eiichi Eiichi

KOGO Eiichi, described as a lazy drunkard;

KATO Mineo;

ENOMOTO Momotaro -- See SSU memorandum of that title; 7 October 1946, DB #1247.

APPENDIX D: THE JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN STOCKHOLM

The Japanese colony in Stockholm was made up entirely of Legation officials and a few journalists; there were no other Japanese residents. The great Japanese trading firms of Okura, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were represented by Swedes and their Japanese agents only came to Stockholm on occasional visits.

ONODERA knows of no organized intelligence activity within the Legation. He says that there were only three men qualified for such work - TSUCHIYA Jun, KODA Jotaro, URIU Matae - and they were prevented from engaging in it by Minister OKAMOTO, who was strongly opposed to it on principle insofar as accredited diplomats were concerned. ONODERA, who bitterly dislikes the minister, says that he always obstructed intelligence work whenever he could. The chief activity of Legation employees was press and publication analysis. KODA and TSUCHIYA had contacts with certain Swedes and with DMITRIEVSKY, a renegade Soviet diplomat from whom they obtained some useful information on Russia. As previously mentioned, ONODERA made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain intelligence through press conferences and discussions in propaganda meetings.

The Naval Attaché, Captain MISHIMA Iori, IJN, was a radio specialist and had little interest in obtaining intelligence by any but the normal straight forward methods. His assistants worked on press analysis and he had some contacts among Swedish newspapers, including Gunnar MUELLER. ONODERA never heard that he tried to get information from secret sources or was connected in any way with espionage. He does not have a high opinion of MISHIMA's abilities and at one time arranged with Captain KOJIMA, the naval attaché in Berlin, to have him replaced by Captain OJI. However, the development of the war prevented this transfer.

Minister: OKAMOTO Suemasa. Arrived in Stockholm in November 1942. Formerly stationed in the U.S.A. and in England. At the outbreak of war in the Pacific he was Consul General in Singapore. He was interned in India and after his release by exchange came straight to Stockholm. He is a specialist in matters concerning the United States and Britain and considered by the Japanese to have been secretly in favor of the Allies. ONODERA is emphatic in stating that he did everything in his power to hinder the successful carrying out of secret intelligence activities by the members of his staff.

Counsellor: KODA Jotaro. In Stockholm from Feb. 1941 till Jan. 1946, when he was transferred to Zurich, Switzerland. He worked with DMITRIEVSKY and was in touch with Japanese and foreign journalists. German specialist. ONODERA says that he is well qualified for intelligence work.

First Secretary: YAMAGUCHI Iwao. Arrived in February 1942 from Vienna where he had been Consul General. At the time of the outbreak of war he was Consul at Bombay and was interned in India. Subsequently he served in Belgium and Germany. He was the administrative officer and head of the financial section of the Legation.

First Secretary: TSUCHIYA Jun. Specialist in matters concerning the United States; speaks good English. He had good contacts with members of the Swedish Foreign Office, among them GAVE of the press section, GIENANT, and HEPP.

1. Attachments: S-1, arrived in Stockholm in October, 1942. Arrived in 1943  
as a member of a Japanese diplomatic mission. Worked on press analysis  
of British and American publications.

Chief Attaché: HATORI. Arrived the summer of 1944. Formerly in Italy  
worked on press analysis of matters relating to France.

Third Secretary: UTSU Naoto. Arrived in December 1943 from Italy. Had  
formerly been in England. His chief occupation was press analysis  
of matters concerning Britain. SHODERA considers him clever and  
well-suited to intelligence work. He may have had a connection with  
DIMITROV.

Attache: TO Kinichi. Arrived the summer of 1944. Had formerly been in France  
and Portugal. His job was analysis of British and American publications.

Attache: KUDO Ryūichi. Arrived the summer of 1944 with TO. Had formerly served  
in the United States and Lisbon. Worked on United States publications.

Attache: SATO Masatoshi. Arrived in October 1942, formerly in London. Economic  
specialist.

Attache: TAKEUCHI Seiichi. Arrived in October 1942 from Germany. Expert in Ger-  
man matters.

Attache: AOE Kenichi. Arrived in the summer of 1944, formerly in France. Radio  
technician. He was an old man and knew little about the latest radio  
developments. He was in charge only of the reception of the daily  
news broadcasts from Tokyo.

Clerk: HONI. Arrived in the summer of 1944 from Lisbon with TO and ANTO. Code  
clerk.

Clerk: HANAHAMA. Code clerk.

Clerk: YAMAGUCHI. In Stockholm since 1940. Worked under YAMAGUCHI Ryo in the  
administrative and financial section.

Clerk: MAKINURA. Also in administrative and financial section.

#### Office of the Naval Attaché

Naval Attaché: MISHIMA, Captain Iori (see above).

Assistant Naval Attaché: INABA, Capt., IJN. Came from Italy in 1944. Disbursing  
Officer, carried out liaison with the Military Attaché's office.

Clerk: YAMAHAMA. Came to Stockholm from Berlin. Stenographer.

Civilian employee: WANUTA Kohichi. Engineer; arrived in April 1942 as Mitsu-  
bishi representative. Had formerly been in the United States.

Civilian employee: SEZAKI Haruo. Office clerk. Formerly in Paris, where he  
had studied painting before the war.

#### Distribution:

G-2, CINCPAC, Tokyo  
TD-WGDS (1)  
ONI (3)  
State (1)  
CIG (1)  
FBI (1)

PLEASE CLEAR WITH OFFICE  
OF ORIGIN BEFORE INITIATING  
ACTION BASED ON THIS MEMO-